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brief 15

Security Sector Reform

june 00

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brief 15

Security Sector Reform

Herbert Wulf, editor

june 00

Zusammenfassung

German Summary

Es gibt heute eine Reihe von Anlässen, um sich aus entwicklungspolitischer Sicht mit der Reform des Sicherheitssektors zu beschäftigen: die angemessene Höhe der Militärausgaben, die Demokratisierung und das Ende von Militärregimes, das Bestreben um “good governance”, friedenserhaltende Missionen der Vereinten Nationen, Abrüstung, Demobilisierung und Reintegration von Streitkräften, Konfliktprävention und der Wiederaufbau nach dem Ende von Kriegen und gewaltsamen Konflikten sowie Programme zur Gewährleistung innergesellschaftlicher Sicherheit für die Bürger. Aus entwicklungspolitischem Blickwinkel sind all dies Ansatzpunkte für die Reform des Sicherheitssektors. Verschiedene internationale Akteure engagieren sich – teils mit beträchtlichen Programmen, teils noch vorsichtig. Zu nennen sind vor allem die Vereinten Nationen, die Weltbank und die Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Darüber hinaus hat die britische Regierung von allen bilateralen und multilateralen Geberorganisationen und Ländern am deutlichsten die Reform des Sicherheitssektors in das Zentrum ihrer Entwicklungspolitik gerückt. Siehe den Beitrag von Ball in diesem *brief*.

Andere bilaterale Geberländer, der Internationale Währungsfond, die Europäische Union sowie verschiedene Regionalorganisationen beschäftigen sich ebenfalls mit bestimmten Aspekten sicherheitsrelevanter Fragen. So waren die deutsche, japanische und niederländische Regierung relativ früh an der Diskussion um die entwicklungspolitisch relevante Höhe der Militärausgaben beteiligt. Verschiedene Länder engagieren sich in Demobilisierungsprogrammen, in der Kontrolle von Kleinwaffen, in Minenräumprojekten und anderen

sicherheitsrelevanten Projekten. Häufig steht Krisenprävention als Schwerpunkt der Entwicklungspolitik – ebenfalls mit deutlichen Verbindungslinien zum Militär und Sicherheitssektor – in der Diskussion. Allerdings sind diese Projekte in den seltensten Fällen *expressis verbis* Teil einer Reform des Sicherheitssektors.

Eine entwicklungspolitisch orientierte Reform verfolgt keine militär- oder sicherheitspolitischen Ziele: Struktur und Kapazität der Akteure im Sicherheitssektor sollen für eine soziale, wirtschaftliche, politische und humanitäre Entwicklung optimiert werden.

In diesem *brief* werden fünf Papiere zum Thema veröffentlicht, die bei einer internationalen Konferenz des BICC – *The Contribution of Disarmament and Conversion to Conflict Prevention and its Relevance for Development Cooperation* – vorgelegt wurden.

Michael Brzoska analysiert das Konzept der Sicherheitsreform und weist u.a. auch auf mögliche Fallstricke hin, die entstehen können, wenn Entwicklungszusammenarbeit sich in Projekten der Reform des Sicherheitssektors engagiert. Nicole Ball präsentiert in ihrem Beitrag die bisherigen Erfahrungen der britischen Regierung und präzisiert die Rahmenbedingungen, die in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit beachtet werden müssen. Laurie Nathan erläutert am Beispiel Südafrikas die Chancen und Hindernisse für eine Reform des Sicherheitssektors. Bernd Hoffmann und Colin Gleichmann legen die Erfahrungen der Demobilisierung und Reintegration ehemaliger

Kombattanten aus der Sicht einer Geberorganisation dar. In diesem Beitrag wird deutlich, dass Demobilisierung und Reintegration vielfältige Ansatzpunkte für die Reform des Sicherheitssektors bieten. Peggy Mason plädiert nach einer gründlichen Analyse der Abrüstungs-, Demobilisierungs- und Reintegrationsprogramme der Vereinten Nationen für einen umfassenden Ansatz, der Entwicklungsprogramme und die Reform des Sicherheitssektors einschließt.

In diesen Beiträgen werden vorrangig die Möglichkeiten (und Hindernisse) für externe Akteure der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit thematisiert. Die Analysen beschränken sich ausschließlich auf Entwicklungsländer. Es ist selbstverständlich, dass die Reform des Sicherheitssektors von externen Akteuren unterstützt, jedoch nicht ohne die maßgebliche Beteiligung der Akteure vor Ort durchgeführt werden kann.

Die Reform des Sicherheitssektors ist ein sensibler Bereich der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Um Missverständnisse zu vermeiden, sei ausdrücklich darauf hingewiesen, dass die begrüßenswerte Beschäftigung von Geberorganisationen mit dem Thema Reform des Sicherheitssektors nicht automatisch bedeuten sollte, sich an diesen Reformvorhaben zu beteiligen. In jedem Einzelfall sind die Konsequenzen eines solchen Engagements sorgfältig zu prüfen. Es bleibt – angesichts knapper Mittel – weiterhin abzuwägen, welche Prioritäten in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit gesetzt werden. Die Sicherheit der Menschen kann, je nach den vorliegenden politischen und wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen, möglicherweise durch indirekte Maßnahmen (wie die Stärkung der Zivilgesellschaft oder Demobilisierungs- und Reintegrationsprogramme) wirkungsvoller gestärkt werden als durch direktes Engagement in den Streitkräften oder bei der Polizeireform.

Introduction

There are many factors which should be considered in dealing with reform of the security sector from a development perspective: the appropriate size of military expenditures, democratization and the end of military regimes, the need for good governance (which should include the armed forces), peacekeeping missions of the United Nations, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed forces, conflict prevention and reconstruction after the end of wars as well as programs to guarantee the internal security of societies. From a development point of view, all of these factors should provide motivation for investigating the promotion of security sector reform. Various international actors have engaged in such programs—some with substantial inputs, others rather cautiously. This applies particularly to the United Nations, the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In addition, of all the bilateral and multilateral donors the British Government has most systematically made security sector reform a focal point of its development policy. This is clearly visible both in its development concept and in projects of economic and development cooperation (see Nicole Ball's analysis in this publication).

Other bilateral donors, the International Monetary Fund, the European Union and several regional organizations deal with certain aspects of security. The German, Japanese and Dutch governments, for example, engaged many years ago in a development debate on the appropriate size of military expenditures. Various countries assist demobilization and reintegration programs for ex-combatants, mine clearance and other security relevant projects. In addition, crisis prevention—again with clear

links to the military and the security sector—has emerged as a core element of development policy. However, most of these projects are only occasionally explicit parts of a security sector reform program.

Security sector reform is, of course, carried out not only by international and national actors in the countries concerned under the auspices of development, but also on the basis of other motives—most prominently due to security policy aims. In contrast to military-driven goals, reform of the security sector has different aims from a development perspective: the structure and the capacity of the security sector actors (military and police) should be optimized for social, economic, political and human development.

Five papers are published in this *brief*, originally presented at an international BICC conference entitled “*The Contribution of Disarmament and Conversion to Conflict Prevention and its Relevance for Development Cooperation*”. Michael Brzoska analyses the concept of security sector reform and the potential pitfalls when development cooperation engages in such projects. Nicole Ball presents in her contribution the experiences and practices of the British Government and describes the conditions under which security sector reform has a chance for success. Laurie Nathan illustrates the chances for and barriers to security sector reform by drawing on the example of the Republic of South Africa. Bernd Hoffmann and Colin Gleichmann present donor perspectives in demobilization and reintegration programs. Their contribution illustrates the manifold entry points which demobilization and reintegration programs offer for security sector reform. Peggy Mason opts—after an analysis of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs under the

auspices of the United Nations—for a comprehensive approach, which should be embedded in development programs and which should include a reform of the security sector.

The chapters look primarily at the possibilities (and hindrances) for external actors in development cooperation. The analysis is limited to the developing countries. It is obvious that reform of the security sector can be externally assisted, but it cannot be undertaken without primary inputs from the actors in the countries concerned.

Reform of the security sector is a sensitive area of development cooperation. To avoid any misunderstanding, it is important to point out that the commendable engagement of donors in the debate on security sector reform does not imply that they should automatically participate in all reform projects. It is necessary to consider the effects of such a program in each and every case. With a view to the persistent scarcity of resources it remains an important task to set priorities in development cooperation. The security of people might—depending on the political and economic situation in a country—be better served by other means than security sector reform, e.g. strengthening civil society or demobilization and reintegration programs.

The Concept of Security Sector Reform

by Michael Brzoska

Introduction

The 1990s brought about a renewed interest in military-related issues among those concerned with development policy and practice. This revival began with a focus on resources, on cutting excessive military expenditures, and on reinvesting the peace dividend (Ball, 1993; Büttner *et al.*, 1996; OECD, 1997; Ball, 1998b). It continued with an interest in the military aspects of conflict prevention, conflict resolution and, especially, post-conflict reconstruction (OECD, 1998; World Bank, 1998). Now, at the end of the 1990s, a new concept has begun to attract attention—that of security sector reform (Ball, 1998a; Short, 1999).

What is security sector reform? Why is it important? What are its goals and instruments? What does it promise to achieve? What are its possible pitfalls? What factors contribute to or impede successful security sector reform? These and other questions are addressed in this contribution. Its objective is to put the current discussion of security sector reform among development policy-makers and practitioners into a broader context, and to provide a historical perspective on the role of the military in development and on security sector modernization in the developing countries. The discussion then focuses on security sector reform in development policy and practice.

A historical perspective

The 1990s is not the first period of recent history in which theoreticians and practitioners of development policy have examined military-related issues; there was much interest in such questions as early as the 1960s, a decade of lively debate on the proper role of the armed forces in the developing countries. This debate emanated from several concerns and dealt with several issues. One issue was the use of resources by the armed forces and whether the resources should be spent in another way in order to promote development (United Nations, 1962). A second was the contribution of the armed forces to nation-building in states that often had artificial borders or large social gaps. Another was the role of armed forces in modernization. Many academics and policy-makers saw the military as one of, if not *the* most modern institution in many developing countries, with respect to both organizational capacity and the value orientations of its members.

This rather positive view of the role of the developing countries' armed forces began to change slowly in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Much of this re-evaluation stemmed from the wave of military interventions in political life, often by armed forces which had previously been considered to be apolitical. In some Asian countries, and many African and Latin American states, armed forces took over the government, generally claiming that they would do a better job of developing their countries than their civilian counterparts did. Academic

research in the 1970s shifted to an analysis of the causes of coups and the consequences of military rule (Ball, 1981). While the results of such analysis might in theory have had an impact on development policy and practice—for instance, on which kinds of policies and projects were appropriate in countries with or without military governments—they seldom did. The military more or less disappeared from the development policy agendas. The main reason was the overarching East–West confrontation. The question whether a country was ruled by the military or by civilians was secondary to which side the ruling group took in the East–West conflict. Justifications for military rule were developed in both the West and the East. Military issues were hopelessly intertwined with ideological issues. Development policy-makers thought it best to avoid military- and security-related issues where possible.

It took the end of the Cold War to put military-related issues back on the agenda of development policy, for several reasons:¹

■ Excessive military expenditures.

A number of bilateral donors, such as Germany, and international organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, condemned excessive military expenditures, which in their analysis were detrimental to economic development. They began to encourage the governments of developing countries to reduce their military expenditures. A few donors went further and introduced excessive military expenditures as a criterion for determining the size of development aid (Ball, 1998b). However, it proved difficult to find

¹ I do not deal here with considerations of security sector reform from other perspectives, such as that of peacekeeping. It should be noted, however, that peacekeepers have frequently been confronted with questions of security sector reform; cf. Oakley *et al.*, 1998.

solid criteria for determining what were excessive military expenditures (Büttner *et al.*, 1995; MacDonald, 1996). In addition, the dearth of reliable data on military expenditures made assessments difficult (OECD, 1997). Similarly, the proposals for a redistribution of savings from decreased military expenditures to development purposes did not receive serious attention (UNDP, 1994).

■ **Democratization.** The end of military rule in many Latin American countries in the 1980s and the 'second wave' of democratization in Africa stimulated thinking about how to bring armed forces under stable civilian control. Two approaches were prioritized, reflecting the discussion of the 1960s on the proper political role of the armed forces: professionalization of the armed forces and strengthening of civilian institutions. It was argued that professionalization of the armed forces, as regards their role, organization and attitude, would prevent them from stepping outside their civilian-set mandate (Huntingdon, 1957, 1985). Strong civilian institutions, elected parliaments and governments were seen as strong barriers to military intervention in politics (Finer, 1962; Perlmutter, 1975). This two-track perception of how best to avoid military intervention in politics fosters a strict dichotomy in assistance programs: professionalization is within the realm of military aid, and thus within the realm of defense ministries willing to provide such aid, while strengthening of civilian institutions is the responsibility of 'civilian' ministries, foreign ministries and ministries for development cooperation (Welch and Mendelson, 1998).

■ **Governance.** The discussion on excessive military expenditures rapidly became part of the more general debate on the political and economic prerequisites for effective development assistance. Effective resource use, including minimal military expenditures, was one element of what in international parlance is called good governance (World Bank, 1994). The discussion also took up elements of the democratization debate by strongly emphasizing the conduct and legitimacy of governments. Military forces should come under the general rules of parliamentary control, accountability and other procedures seen as important in establishing transparent and legitimate government. Given the important role many armed forces play in the developing countries, concerns about their conduct became concerns of the governance debate as well. Armed forces can directly affect governance, for instance when they put themselves outside the jurisdiction of the law, violate human rights, etc. To quote from the policy statement of the British Department for International Development (DFID): "An unreformed security sector often fails to prevent and sometimes causes violent conflict which leads to increased suffering and poverty." (UK DFID, 1999, p. 2)

■ **Demobilization support.** The increasing willingness of development policy decision-makers to take military-related issues into account found an important practical application in demobilization support in post-conflict situations. Demobilization support by the World Bank, bilateral donors and others retained a strong link to the reduction of military

expenditures (Coletta *et al.*, 1996). Increasingly, however, it was also justified by the wider spectrum of post-conflict reconstruction (OECD, 1998; World Bank, 1998).

■ **Post-conflict reconstruction.** Post-conflict situations are regularly marked by a grave imbalance between the types and numbers of armed forces and what is politically desirable and economically sustainable. Military-style forces are generally too large and need to be reduced. At the same time, however, various types of armed forces may need to be integrated into one military force. On the other hand, there are often major problems of internal security which require the build-up of appropriate institutions and forces. Police forces may be lacking or so affected by previous abuses that they have to be abolished. In addition to law enforcement, legal institutions—including the penal system—may need to be overhauled. Small-arms collection programs and other practical disarmament instruments may help to improve internal security. Outside assistance to improve security in post-conflict situations remains a contentious issue for development policy. However, in a number of countries development assistance has been provided, in order to implement police reform for instance (Oakley *et al.*, 1998; Neild, 1998). It has also been used to supplement nationally financed programs to enhance internal security, for instance in Mali. The United Nations mission sent to Mali in 1994 and 1995 to study the security situation, with a special emphasis on the proliferation of small arms, concluded that, without the guarantee of security and stability, sustainable economic and social development would not occur. The proposed solution was an integrated program, with outside support, for a reduction of the military force,

buildup of local police, customs and gendarmerie forces, and development projects for disadvantaged groups (Poulton and Youssouf, 1998).

■ **Concerns about physical security.**

Internal security problems have also been on the agendas of development policy-makers in post-conflict situations. A lack of physical security may be a major impediment to economic growth and human development, especially in post-conflict situations. While this is obviously so in open military conflicts (also noted by organizations and individuals working in conflict areas; see e.g. Anderson, 1999, pp. 63–66), it also holds as a more general proposition (Collier, *et al.*, 1999). To quote the policy statement of the British government: “The Government’s White Paper on International Development, Eliminating World Poverty, recognizes that an essential condition for sustained development and poverty elimination is security.” (UK DFID, 1999, p. 1) Does the perception of the relationship between security and development make the provision of security a development policy goal? So far, donors have shied away from drawing this conclusion, except in select post-conflict situations. There are many pitfalls, some of which donors have experienced in their support to military and police forces in the 1960s. Not surprisingly, the broad introductory statement by the British Department for International Development (DFID) is followed by a much narrower program of security sector reform.

In some cases, development assistance officials were faced with the privatization of security functions by recipient governments. While the authority hiring private

security services may see this as improving efficiency, donors have persistently objected to the devolution of public security functions to private organizations.

■ **Wider concepts of security.**

In the course of the 1990s, the scope of military-related issues considered relevant to the development debate was increasingly broadened. The first topic, excessive military expenditures, was often discussed in narrow economic terms. Later, clearly political topics such as institution-building in post-conflict situations entered the debate. There are also some engaged in the development discussion who would like to address security and military issues directly, for example, the proper levels of military effort (Büttner *et al.*, 1995; MacDonald, 1996).

The security sector in the developing countries

While it is always hazardous to generalize, it seems safe to say that the security sectors in the developing countries—and in many transition states—are fundamentally different from those in the highly industrialized countries. This begins with the use of the term ‘security sector’, which is unusual for the developed countries but makes sense in many poor countries (Ball, 1988). In practical terms, it makes little sense for many of the developing countries to distinguish between military, paramilitary and police forces, if the latter exist at all. The lack of differentiation is even more pronounced in the case of non-official or opposition forces than regular government forces. In practical terms, the security sector is generally understood to cover (Ball, 1998a; UK DFID, 1999) those organizations in a society which are responsible, or should be responsible, for protecting the state and communities within the state. This may include the military, paramilitary, police forces and intelligence services as well as those

civilian structures directly responsible for oversight and administration. Are there, in addition to direct power interests, incompetence and other such deficiencies—structural factors—that make ‘reform’ a pressing need in more than only a few countries? I suggest that the following four elements merit special attention.

■ **Role orientation.**

The primary role of many of the developing countries’ armed forces is to preserve the government—to ensure the security of the ruling regime. This may entail external defense against cross-border attacks, the primary role of military forces in developed industrialized countries. In light of the experiences in the past decades with respect to the predominant threat to ruling regimes, however, it is rational for armed forces to concentrate on internal enemies. There is obviously a clear link here between the stability of regimes and the predominant role of armed forces. The importance of armed forces as pillars of control increases with the lack of political stability and economic success (Perlmutter, 1975).

■ **Functional differentiation.**

Where military forces are in charge of internal security, there is little room for police forces or other non-military-style forces. Typically, in developing countries the police forces are either small, with little authority, or a branch of the armed forces. Their public image is often poor (Perous de Montclos, 1997; Neild, 1998). The differentiation between heavily armed, unified, hierarchically organized, physically separated armed forces and light-armed, functionally differentiated, organized police forces dispersed according to population density—typical for highly industrialized countries—is less prevalent in poor countries.

■ **Civilian control.** Armed forces, like any other organization, strive to achieve autonomy. The establishment and retention of objective and subjective control over armed forces are, however, especially difficult when the armed forces guarantee the survival of a regime against internal enemies. An organization whose main role is to defend the state against internal enemies will most likely be reluctant to accept an authority other than the ruling regime, if it can accept that authority at all. The armed forces of a number of countries will, in both perception and practice, regard themselves as above the civilians. In addition, the idea of broader, non-ruling-group, civilian participation in public life is historically linked to the development of modern industrial societies. Few developing countries have such traditions; in others they have been difficult to establish because of opposition from the armed forces. Institutions in modern societies see themselves as serving the public; armed forces are one professional bureaucracy among several (Perlmutter, p. 4), albeit with very special skills.

■ **Professionalization.** The combination of a wide range of roles focusing on internal security, filled by one or several forces which are all basically run in military style, as well as a high degree of autonomy and little differentiation in civilian control, all mitigate against the development of specific security forces for specific purposes. It is precisely this differentiation, however, which forms the basis for professionalization of the various forces, for instance a military force for defense against heavily armed and well-organized enemies; a well-armed, hierarchically structured police force to patrol borders and fight organized crime; and one or several police forces which fight local crime. One important element of professionalization is the honing of skills specific to functions.

Different skills are needed for different types of forces. Typically, however, differentiated modern professional forces are characterized by management skills similar to those of other large organizations. In his standard work Huntingdon stresses the parallel development of professional armed forces and corporate capitalism (Huntingdon, 1957). Professionalization also entails operation by rules and regulations and can therefore help to prevent corruption, intensive involvement of members of the armed forces in many types of economic activity, violation of human rights, and other illegal activities of individuals and units.

Dimensions of security sector reform

In one sentence, the ultimate objective of security sector reform is to create armed, uniformed forces which are functionally differentiated, professional forces under objective and subjective civilian control, at the lowest functional level of resource use. Obviously, this definition conceals major dilemmas (Table 1), the most obvious of which is that between resource use and provision of security. Another is the dilemma between civilian control and professionalization.

A few additional qualifications need to be made. First, no one reform model is applicable in all conditions, and within the broad concept of modern forces many specific forms are possible.² Second, the specific circumstances of a country may allow only certain elements of reform to be attempted or require specific emphasis on other elements.

Table 1: Reformed security sector

Political level	Objective and subjective civilian control
Level of economic development	Minimal resource use by the security sector
Institutional level (armed forces, police, paramilitary)	Professionalization of forces
Societal level	Provision of physical security for the population

² Two such forms are special cases, in practice sometimes linked: revolutionary forces, and militia forces. Revolutionary forces are generally under the strict control of a party or other political group, and their main task is the defense of an ideology. They need not be very professional with respect to either specific skills or management. Militia forces also lack professionalism but are under broader, often local, political control.

There are various ways to describe the general agenda for security sector reform. One highly abstract description is presented in Table 1, which distinguishes three levels. A more concrete description is given in the following list, which is informed by similar undertakings (Ball, 1996; Halevy, 1996; Ball, 1998; Welch and Mendelsson, 1998):

■ **Structure of the security sector.**

The first set of elements concerns the optimization of the security sector structure. It includes the following:

Objectives and doctrines. In many cases, the objectives and instruments of forces need to be reviewed. It has been suggested that, at the strategic level, peace and disarmament, regional cooperation, and global arms control must be integral elements of security sector reform (Ball, 1998a). Military doctrines may also have to be changed. One model that has been proposed is that of defensive defense (Möller and Wiberg, 1994; Buzan and Herring, 1998). The review of strategic options may, however, also lead to the decision to abandon military forces and concentrate on police and other non-military-style forces. For example, Haiti and Panama recently decided to dismantle their armed forces.

Size and costs of the security sector. Bloated security sectors remain a major development concern. ‘Right-sizing’ of security sectors is therefore a central element of reform since it can free money for other purposes—a major conversion objective of development policy. Reducing military forces and expenditures is a realistic objective in many parts of the world. Unfortunately, given the low numbers of police forces and their poor salaries in many countries, reform may also have to be accompanied by increases in the costs of at least some types of uniformed forces.

Functional differentiation and separation of forces. In addition to a military force, which is housed in barracks generally located far from major population centers and focused on fighting well-armed enemies with heavy weapons, there should be other uniformed forces. It is essential to have one or several police forces whose major objectives are the prevention of crime and apprehension of criminals. Police forces should cooperate closely with, if not be under the control of, local authorities and should work among the population. There may also be other forces, such as border police, better armed paramilitary troops and special police forces. The important factors are that forces should perform specific functions and that the choices of function made by the proper authorities guide resource allocation among the forces. Development considerations are of obvious importance for making the proper choices.

■ **Professionalization of the security sector.** A second set of elements guides reform within the various forces. Although much depends on the specific circumstances, some general points may still be valid in many cases:

Skill development. Forces need to develop both the specific skills required for their functions and management skills. The latter may be concentrated in ministries of defense.

Rule orientation. Forces need to develop and implement rules of behavior which are in line with general laws and regulations, for instance those on human rights and internal promotion.

Internal democratization. Forces need to balance considerations of hierarchy with those of the citizen participation of policemen, soldiers, officers, etc. in the democratic process.

Technical modernization.

Functional differentiation of forces, reform of doctrine and general improvement of skills will often lead to a demand for new technology, including weapons, which will have to be balanced with other elements of security sector reform, especially cost reduction.

■ **Effective civilian control.** A third set of elements concerns civil–military relations, the transparency of forces in the security sector, and their accountability and subordination under civilian control. The major issues include:

Civilian executive command. In order to strengthen civilian control, the top command, vested in the commander-in-chief, should be a civil position. The administration should also be run by civilians. The appointment of high-ranking officers should be the prerogative of the civilian commanders (for these indicators see US Department of State, 1998).

Legislative oversight. As an element of civilian control, all forces should be accountable to the proper legislative bodies. Parliaments should have access to precise budget information and be in charge of authorizations. As agreed by the International Monetary Fund member governments in 1998 in the framework of fiscal transparency, timely, comprehensive accounts of budget operations should be presented to the legislature and a national audit body or equivalent organization appointed by the legislature should report on their financial integrity (IMF, 1998, pp. 66, 69). Armed forces should not be exempt from the legislative powers of parliaments. For these legal provisions to be practically efficient, parliaments need to have expertise and experts on military and police matters, either as members or in staffs.

Public involvement. The media, as well as civil society at large, should have a role in controlling the armed forces through integrity checks. In order to fulfill this function, the public must have access to as much information as allowed under rules of privacy and national security. The media and the public also need to have expertise and experts to properly evaluate the available data and monitor the behavior of members of the armed forces.

Pitfalls of security sector reform

The term ‘security sector reform’ is deceptively facile; it appears to be a simple undertaking. In practice, however, it is generally a complex and potentially very difficult undertaking. It often requires that power be taken from those who have been disproportionately powerful. It may also require rapid change in an organization that is inherently conservative and resistant to change. Security sector reform may thus be difficult to achieve. Those promoting security sector reform may deem it necessary to sequence reforms and coordinate them with other political processes. Unfortunately, some of the most favored avenues of compromise in security sector reform may be detrimental to the development benefits. It is fairly common practice to shed unreformable officers by ‘golden handshakes’ or to make forces accept civilian control by ‘giving toys to the boys.’ In general, narrow development goals such as saving resources need to be weighted and defended by the actors concerned against more immediate objectives, especially that of political control over the armed forces. Even where security sector reform may appear to proceed smoothly, there is still the danger of a reversal to patterns of pre-reform behavior. In fact, some students of civil–military relations have

argued that highly professional militaries are a greater danger to civil societies than inefficient militaries (Finer, 1962). What seems to be important is to minimize the gap between the efficiency, and thus legitimacy, of civilian and military institutions. There is little sense in having a highly modernized military force when civilian institutions are too weak to provide effective and legitimate control. In such situations, the military may well feel justified in taking over.

There is also the danger of **collusion between an exclusive regime and the armed forces**, another entrenched habit. The elements of security sector reform which probably provide the best barriers to such behavior, namely, democratization of the forces and a strong role of the public at large, are generally the least liked elements among decision-makers in armed forces and politics. They therefore tend to resist reforms.

Security forces, whether military or police, are close to the core of states. They have a monopoly on the use of force which, according to the famous definition of Max Weber, is one of the three constituents of a state. Outside meddling in security sector reform therefore raises critical issues, for both the outsider and the recipient.

The **outsider can become involved in, or inadvertently become the cause of, security sector reform failures**—a not infrequent outcome in the 1960s and early 1970s, when development assistance supported military and police forces. To cite an earlier example, in 1934 the United States left Haiti after a previous intervention and after having trained a constabulary force; the core of this force was later heavily involved in human rights violations, overthrew the elected government of President Aristide, and was finally dismantled by US troops in 1994 (Halevy, 1996, p. 11).

On the other hand, the **interests of a local government and a donor may diverge**, with the danger of the manipulation of one actor by the other. Donors sometimes have other agendas than only security sector reform—agendas based on strategic or economic interests. Similarly, recipients may have their own hidden agendas.

Finally, a local government, fearing that a **program of security sector reform might alienate such important institutions as the military or the police**, may pressure donors to design the program accordingly or abandon it altogether. Donors will then have to judge whether reform assistance which is not strongly supported by the national power-brokers is worthwhile. It will have a hard time bringing about more than marginal effects, but even that may be enough to justify it.

The role of development cooperation and assistance

Security sector reform is a large undertaking with many facets, even at the conceptual level, and much more so at the level of individual country cases. No simple model fits all cases and may not suit a single one.

What, under these circumstances, is the appropriate course of action for development policy-makers and practitioners? I would suggest that there are two principal options: a narrow option and a wide one.

The narrow option focuses on issues that have come to the attention of development policy decision-makers in the 1990s as part of the concerns mentioned in the second section of this paper.

Three instruments seem to have particular priority in the narrow option:

- **Pressure to prioritize development policy objectives** in security sector reform. In the policy dialogue, donors can emphasize the importance of recipients making the right choices with respect to the size and structure of security sector forces. This can be supplemented by support for downsizing armed forces, demobilization, etc.
- **Empowerment of parliaments and civil societies to exercise civilian control.** This may include the support and provision of information for parliamentarians, the training of media representatives and non-governmental organizations, etc.
- **Assistance to improve transparency, fiscal oversight and control,** aimed at reducing resource use. This may entail technical assistance to financial departments of defense ministries, ministries of finance, or national audit bodies.

In the narrow option, donors in principle do not contact the military or police forces in order to avoid being seen as promoting military forces, meddling in domestic political affairs, or being associated with failures in security sector reform. This option concentrates on the 'resource use' and 'enabling of civilian control' boxes in table 1.

In the wide option, the other two boxes of the table also apply. In this option, strengthening uniformed forces is deemed necessary for economic development. It also seeks to promote the professionalization of the armed forces, for instance by improving their management skills. Civil society organizations can help in select fields, such as human-rights training for police forces.

The narrow option has several advantages. It is closer to the tradition of development policy work and is less prone to fall into the many pitfalls outlined above. However, I would also suggest that those in charge of development policy look beyond their own briefs and seek to cooperate closely with policy-makers and practitioners who give, or can give, support in adjacent areas. It seems unnecessary for development assistance organizations to build up their own expertise in these wider areas of security sector reform, but they should promote transparency and remain in close contact and cooperation with others, including defense ministries, military and police forces in both the recipient and donor countries, the latter especially if they are involved in assistance to foreign military and police forces. One reason for this is to increase the effectiveness of the narrow agenda. Another is that, without such contact and coordination, development concerns in security sector reform may fall by the wayside. The priorities in reform of military and police forces, and probably for their outside supporters as well, are likely to lie in improving professionalism and the provision of security, not in reducing resource use and improving the efficiency of civilian control. Development policy actors can help by attempting to provide the balance which is necessary for making security reform a contribution to economic development.

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Good Practices in Security Sector Reform

by Nicole Ball

The Security Sector Reform Agenda¹

The two main objectives of security sector reform are to establish good governance in the security sector and to enhance a country's capacity to develop systems of economic and political governance that benefit society as a whole and foster the creation of a safe and secure environment at the international, regional, national and local levels.

“Security sector reform is the quintessential governance issue. This is so both in the sense that there is enormous potential for misallocation of resources and also because a security sector out of control can have enormous impact on governance—indeed, be a source of malgovernance.”

Robin Luckham, Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex, May 1998.

Good governance

Good governance in the security sector requires that decisions on security-related issues be taken as a matter of course in a coherent, transparent manner. For this to occur, mechanisms for defining security policy, identifying security needs, and assessing the appropriate ways to address these needs must be institutionalized. Similarly, methods must be established for agreeing on the doctrine, missions and structures of the various security forces a government has at its disposal and on how these forces will be financed. It is equally critical to

institutionalize norms and mechanisms for promoting the observance of human rights conventions and norms and the rule of law. While the security forces themselves will naturally have an important role to play in these activities, civilians and civilian organizations and institutions should manage the process. Members of civil society can assist by providing inputs into the decision-making process and by monitoring the activities of the security forces.

Responsible government capable of providing security at all levels of society and promoting broad-based economic and political development requires first of all that the security forces not be involved in governing the country, either directly or indirectly. History is replete with examples of politicized militaries undermining efforts to develop or maintain participatory political systems. State security institutions should neither own nor have other economic or financial interests in commercial enterprises. It is also important to reach and maintain manageable levels of security spending so that economic and social needs are not sacrificed to unsustainably high security budgets. Abuses of civil and human rights committed or condoned by the security forces are unacceptable. Crime prevention and cooperative regional security arrangements can also contribute importantly to achieving this objective.

Security Sector Reform Agenda

- Ensure that security sector organizations, especially the security forces, are accountable both to elected civil authorities and to civil society and that they operate in accordance with democratic principles and the rule of law.
- Make information about security sector budgeting and planning widely available, both within government and to the public, to promote achieving manageable levels of security expenditure. Institutionalize mechanisms that promote security sector transparency.
- Create an environment in which civil society can actively monitor the security sector and be consulted on a regular basis on defense policy, resource allocation and other relevant issues.
- Strengthen civil society organizations and other non-governmental actors to play these roles.
- Foster an environment that promotes regional/subregional peace and security.
- Give adequate attention to specific legacies of war, such as practical disarmament and demobilization.

This reform agenda describes the ideal which all governments should strive to achieve. Every country has room to improve, including the OECD states, and can learn from other members of the international community.

¹ This paper draws heavily on Nicole Ball, “Spreading good practices in security sector reform: Policy options for the British Government,” London: Saferworld, December 1998.

To meet the twin objectives of security sector reform, it is important for civil organizations of the state to function effectively. This would include the ministry of defense, the ministry of finance, the budget office, the office of the auditor general, the office of the national security adviser, the ministry of internal or home affairs, and parliamentary committees dealing with security policy and appropriations, among others. The security forces—the armed forces, intelligence agencies, paramilitary organizations, and police forces—must also operate according to the norms of democratic societies. Effective civil society organizations are needed in areas such as security policy, conflict management, human-rights protection, and development. Well-functioning intergovernmental and civil society organizations at the regional and subregional levels can make important contributions as well.

Achievement of the two core objectives of security sector reform invariably requires some degree of institutional and organizational reform as well as human and organizational capacity-building. The precise nature of the reforms undertaken varies from country to country but can be summarized by the reform agenda in the adjacent box.

It is important to understand that there are different ways to achieve the desired end-states of transparency, accountability, and civil management and oversight. For security sector reform to take root, it must be compatible with the overall framework of social and political development in each country and tailored to each country's circumstances. The central objective is to ensure that governments abide by certain principles. The following discussion lays out the most important principles and suggests how they might be institutionalized.

Civil control

Civil management of the security forces, accountability of the security forces to civil authorities, and professionalization of the security forces. Civil management and oversight of security forces is the cornerstone of good governance in the security sector. For the armed forces, the key aspects include a civilian commander-in-chief, a civilian minister of defense, and a defense ministry independent of the military institutions and with a sizable civilian staff. At a minimum, civilians should staff the key policy- and decision-making positions. Intelligence activities should also be managed by civilians. If the armed forces are to be accountable to elected, civil authorities, rules consistent with democratic practices and international laws and norms for guiding their behavior are critical. Security forces also need to develop modes of behavior consistent with these rules. Officers need to possess a strong management capacity to ensure that the armed forces operate in a manner consistent with democratic practices.

Civil management and oversight also imply a civilian police force which is entirely independent of the armed forces, operates on the principle of policing by consent, protects the free exercise of individual rights and freedoms by all citizens equally, and protects citizens against criminal activities. In addition to having the capacity to adhere to democratic norms and principles, police forces accountable to civil authority require the support of the full range of institutions and organizations involved in the administration of justice—the judicial system, the legal system and the penal system.

Civilian management and oversight of the security forces assume that relevant civil departments and agencies have both the right and obligation to participate in the decision-making process regarding the security sector. Finally, methods for evaluating when

security force personnel have violated civil and human rights must be institutionalized—within both the security forces themselves (for example, inspectors-general offices) and civil bodies (such as human-rights ombudsmen). Where security forces have been involved in human or civil rights abuses, it is important to develop procedures to vet the past behavior of members of the security forces and new recruits.

Transparency in security sector planning and budgeting

Transparency involves making information about security sector planning and budgets widely available, both within government and to the general public. Although there are legitimate reasons to keep some information about the security forces confidential, basic information about the security sector should be accessible to both civilian government officials and members of the public. Indeed, when part of a regional process of confidence-building, the provision of access to information on military strategy, national procedures for planning, institutions involved in the decision-making process, force size, equipment, and plans for weapon procurement can even have a beneficial effect on a country's security position (Interview with an OSCE official, 23 April 1998). Even confidential information must be shared with civilian officials who are responsible for oversight of the security forces.

South African White Papers

South Africa has produced white papers on defense, intelligence, safety and security, and participation in international peace operations since the end of minority rule in 1994. The government invited comments from civil society on a draft of the Defence White Paper and this draft and the final version of all South African white papers can be found on the Internet at: http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/white_papers.

A lack of transparency risks undermining economic stability by facilitating the misallocation of resources. Therefore, expenditures on the armed forces, police, intelligence and other security-related items must be treated exactly as other forms of public expenditure in terms of planning, preparation and legislative approval. All security-related spending must be on-budget. Off-budget expenditures by any of the security forces can distort economic development and enable the forces to avoid developing responsible, accountable planning and budgeting practices.

Security budgets should be subject to rigorous audits, and the finance ministry or budget office should have the capacity to analyze security spending. The legislature must also have an independent capacity to evaluate the security environment and budget requests from the security forces. Legislators need to have access to relevant information and receive security budgets in a timely fashion so that they can analyze and debate their content. Budget and audit documents must be in the public domain.

Similarly, the defense planning process should be as transparent as possible. Defense policies should be subject to legislative debate and comments from the public. Defense programs need to be reviewed in detail from time to time, particularly when major changes in the internal or external security environment occur. Developing white papers, which establish policy parameters, is a critical component of the planning process. Underlying the policy parameters are a set of key principles on which the major stakeholders, including civil society, have reached consensus. Organizational evaluations follow the establishment of policy parameters. Such evaluations should include not only the security forces themselves but also the civil management and

oversight bodies in the executive and legislative branches. Input from civil society will strengthen these reviews, and their findings should be made public.

The central elements of security policies and policies on civil–military and civil–police relationships need to be enacted into law, along with disciplinary codes for the security forces. Mechanisms also need to be established to enable relevant legislative and executive bodies to review confidential security information.

Regional and international transparency instruments and mechanisms should be supported by all governments and strengthened where relevant. The major international instruments include the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the United Nations standardized military expenditure reporting system. Regional and subregional organizations which encourage the exchange of information on military budgets, arms transfers, and defense policies include the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), NATO and its associated states in the Partnership for Peace program, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organization of American States (OAS). It should be noted, however, that mechanisms have their limitations. The UN instruments publish data received from governments, but only a few UN members have reported military spending since the inception of the reporting mechanism in the early 1980s. Nearly half the number of UN member states provide information on arms imports and exports. This higher rate can be attributed in large part to the strong participation of the major arms-exporting states, which has encouraged

the importers to provide data as well. Approximately 60 percent of all OSCE governments report their military spending but this information is not currently made public.

The role of civil society

In democratic societies, civil society plays an important role in monitoring the development and application of security policy and the activities of the security forces. It also acts as an important resource for the security community.

Civil Society and Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone

Many civil society organizations in Sierra Leone express their views on the government's plan to include members of the former armed forces—which had mutinied in May 1997—in the new armed forces that the government began to establish in 1998. Their opposition forced the government to confront the fact that the armed forces have been thoroughly discredited in the eyes of many Sierra Leone citizens and to promote a national dialogue between the remnants of the armed forces and civil society.

Source: Author's interviews.

In their monitoring or watchdog function, non-governmental actors seek to engage the government on topics such as overall defense policy, expenditure and procurement proposals and decisions; the doctrine, size, structure and deployment of the different security forces; training of foreign security forces; and, where relevant, the sale of weapons and weapon technology abroad and foreign deployments of national forces. Such independent analyses are meant not only to challenge government policies but also to inform the debate and provide useful input into the decision-

making process. The media often play an important role in communicating ideas and encouraging debate. In many developing and transition countries, the number of individuals and organizations capable of playing an informed, responsible watchdog role is limited. This is both a legacy of many years of authoritarian government and a consequence of poverty. Even when countries have a relatively vibrant civil society and reasonably active media, expertise on security sector issues is almost always inadequate. However, a lack of detailed knowledge of security issues is not necessarily an insurmountable barrier to the participation of civil society in monitoring the activities of the security sector. By closely watching the development of government policies and asking pertinent questions, civil society can influence the choices made by government.

Civil society acts as a resource for the security sector in a number of ways. Most fundamentally, it can provide a pool of knowledgeable individuals to fill government positions in the relevant agencies. It also can provide specialized skills, such as human rights trainers, legal experts, financial experts and the like, either as adjuncts to specific programs or as military–civil affairs officers. Civilians should also have the capacity to staff review boards and other oversight bodies, conduct investigations for the government in research and analysis units, and take part in special panels created by the government or by quasi-governmental institutions to examine specific policy options and decisions. As with the watchdog function, the capacity of civil society in many countries to act as a resource for government is weak; therefore, human capacity-strengthening efforts are critically important.

Regional security arrangements

A civil war may have its roots in poor governance of the security sector in a country. However, such conflicts rarely remain confined to one country, as events in East Africa, the Republic of Congo and the Balkans have repeatedly demonstrated. Developing civilian management and oversight of the security forces, achieving transparency in military budgeting, and attaining sustainable levels of military spending are all challenges confronted by many states. Consequently, there is considerable potential for countries with shared problems and experiences within the same geographic area to promote the main objectives of security sector reform by working together to reduce tensions and enhance mutual security. More attention is currently being paid to the ability of regional and subregional organizations to encourage new modes of behavior in the security sector. Regional and subregional dialogues and structures for security and cooperation can enhance both external and internal security in the participating countries. In terms of external security, they have the potential to help to resolve problems with transnational implications and effects. This is not an easy process, as witnessed by the conflicts in Central/East Africa and the Balkans. However, the strong reaction of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to the overthrow of the democratically elected government in Sierra Leone in May 1997 demonstrates that regional organizations can help address problems in ways that have the potential to minimize the spread of conflicts and lay the foundations for significant security sector reforms that may prevent their recurrence.

Regional organizations also have the potential to help prevent problems that could have regional repercussions by promoting confidence-building

measures (CBMs) that may lead to regional arms control and disarmament activities and even regimes. Such CBMs might include disclosing information on military strategy, national procedures for planning, institutions involved in the decision-making process, force size, equipment and plans for weapon procurement as well as levels and composition of military spending. The same activities can simultaneously serve as domestic CBMs by increasing security sector transparency and making it easier for civilians to oversee the activities of the security forces. There can, for example, be positive spin-offs in the relationship between governments and civil society. Additionally, when the information collected through regional and subregional mechanisms is made public, domestic transparency can benefit as well. It is therefore important that regional mechanisms make public the information they gather.

“Second-Track” Dialogue for Regional Confidence Building

Non-governmental institutes play an important role in facilitating regional dialogue on security issues in East Asia, and policy entrepreneurs from these institutes are often called upon to contribute to the preparation of key regional security meetings. In parallel with processes for inter-governmental discussion (such as ASEAN and the broader ASEAN Regional Forum), governments have recognized the value of “second-track” dialogue as a confidence building measure. During the 1990s, there has been an explosion of mechanisms designed to enable non-governmental experts to engage in discussions on regional security issues. Seventysix regional security events in the Asia-Pacific area were held in the second half of 1997 alone.

Source: Malcom Chalmers, Confidence Building in Southeast Asia, Boulder, CO, Westview Press 1996

Good Practices for External Actors

External actors can promote the security sector reform agenda in a number of ways. Based on experience to date, the most important types of assistance to improve the ability of local actors to undertake security sector reform are those that:

- strengthen civil institutions
- professionalize civilians
- professionalize the security forces
- institutionalize mechanisms for developing security policy and assessing security needs
- provide assistance to overcome the legacies of war.

If successful, these reform efforts should greatly enhance the transparency and accountability of the security sector and strengthen the ability of civilians to manage the security sector.

There is also a set of key considerations to which external actors should give priority when providing assistance to reforming countries. They should:

- define security sector reform and foster collaboration and new partnerships
- work to develop the commitment of national leadership
- build on what exists locally and take local ownership seriously
- make ample use of confidence-building activities
- build new partnerships
- take a long-term view.

Strengthening civil institutions

If civilians are to manage the security sector effectively, the relevant governmental and non-governmental civil institutions must exist and function proficiently. This includes ministries of defence, justice, and internal or home affairs; independent ombudsmen’s offices; civilian review boards; penal institutions; legislatures; budget offices, audit units, and finance ministries; and civil society bodies such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs), professional associations, research and advocacy institutes, and universities.

Providing technical and financial support to develop the capacity of all these organizations is in principle no different from strengthening the

capacity of a broad range of governmental and non-governmental institutions to address issues relating to health care or education. This is a step that urgently needs to be taken.

External actors should also prioritize assisting states to develop the capacity to widely disseminate information on the security sector, within government as well as to civil society. Furthermore, the capacity of civil society organizations needs to be developed to enable them to assess and monitor government policy and actions in this area. Technical assistance can be provided through a combination of long- and short-term secondments as well as study visits.

Professionalizing civilians

One of the characteristics of countries with the greatest need for security sector reform is the security forces’ firm belief that civilians are incapable of evaluating security requirements or taking responsibility for security-related decisions. Most of these countries have a paucity of civilian security analysts, both inside and outside government, but capability is not the primary issue. Rather, the shortage of civilian security analysts derives in large part from the security forces’ unwillingness to share information with civilians, restrictions on media reporting of security-related issues, official hostility toward civil society organizations that attempt to deal with security issues, and a dearth of courses at local universities and other training institutions.

In order to increase the capacity of civilians to take part in decision-making in the security sector, civilians in both the public and non-governmental sectors need to be trained in security studies; defense budgeting, planning, management and procurement; conflict management; and related subjects. Training for judges, lawyers, penal officers and others, including civil society actors such as research and advocacy groups or professional associations, who are

involved in the administration of justice and the protection of human rights is also required.

Technical assistance of this nature has been funded through development and military assistance programs. Training has also been provided through regular university courses, short courses focusing on specific topics, seminars and expert-exchanges. Some of this training can occur in the partner country, some in the donor country. Specialized courses in states which are not members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) should also be supported, particularly when they serve an entire region. Where feasible, opportunities to develop similar courses, particularly those that might serve a regional clientele, should be explored.

Professionalizing the security forces

The Defence Management Programme in South Africa targets mid-level leaders and officers from civil and defence organizations and other relevant decision-makers from SADC countries who are responsible for strategic planning and training. It was able to get off the ground because of funding from the Danish government, which continues to be a major financial backer. The British government has recently provided support as well.

The professionalization of security forces implies acceptance of the roles and responsibilities of security forces in democratic societies and of the need for a clear distinction between the types of behavior that are legitimate in discharging these responsibilities and those that are not. There are a number of mechanisms through which the international community can assist the process of professionalization:

- routine training courses and military-to-military or police-to-police missions
- special missions conducted by security, justice, political and even development officials at both the senior and working levels, aimed at reinforcing the importance attached to issues such as civilian control, accountability, and transparency
- special meetings and conferences convened by multilateral or regional inter-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, or academic institutions to discuss a variety of security-related issues
- sustained, medium- to long-term advisers, mentors, and/or monitors.

Military assistance should emphasize training programs to imbue soldiers with an understanding of the appropriate roles and behaviors in democratic societies. This involves promoting respect for civilian government, the rule of law, and international human-rights standards. Every country needs a technically competent, disciplined force that operates according to domestic and international laws and norms. The need to put their own training houses in order offers the donor governments involved in delivering military and police assistance the opportunity to treat their interactions with their foreign counterparts as a two-way street in which both parties share lessons and problems. This may make it easier to gain greater acceptance of the need for such reforms in non-OECD countries. Training teams staffed by either military or civilians or a combination of both as needs dictate have proven extremely effective. Police assistance should concentrate on strengthening the management capacity of the police force to implement change. It should seek to develop an understanding of what it means to be a

police officer in a democratic society, with community-based policing and policing by consent as high priorities. Anti-drug, -fraud, and -corruption programs are important components of police training, as are efforts to strengthen the capacity for strategic planning within the police force. In-country advisers are critical and should seek to help the host governments to devise the systems that are best suited to their own countries rather than providing 'off-the-shelf' models.

Institutionalize mechanisms for developing security policy and assessing security needs

The ability to engage in strategic planning on a whole range of security sector issues is a central element of good governance in the security sector. The capacity to plan effectively is heavily dependent on the existence of functioning organizations and institutions and knowledgeable, appropriately trained personnel in both the security forces and the civil organizations charged with managing the security sector. Many of the countries in greatest need of improving governance in the security sector have severe institutional and human-resource weaknesses. However, even when the institutional and human-resource prerequisites are met, there is no guarantee that strategic planning will occur or that it will occur in a transparent manner and include all the relevant stakeholders. It is therefore incumbent upon external actors to encourage strategic planning exercises and provide the necessary support. Due attention should also be given to a civilian-led strategic policy planning process within the overall program of security sector assistance.

“Countries need help in assessing the threat to them and in deciding what they need in terms of resources to meet these threats... As a development agency, you want a country to get decent advice on military strategies.”

Source: *Author’s interview with donor agency representative, 1999.*

Technical assistance for developing the capacity to conduct planning exercises and institutional evaluations and for producing relevant legislation can be provided by a range of external actors: defense, justice, and foreign ministries; the armed forces; police forces; development-assistance agencies; civil society; and regional organizations. To the extent possible, such technical assistance should come from the region rather than from an OECD country.

Define security sector reform and foster collaboration and new partnerships

Successful security sector reforms require the collaboration of a wide range of actors—national and international, governmental and non-governmental. Individuals with expertise in the armed forces, policing, intelligence, defense and police management and planning, defense budgeting, public-sector and fiscal management, foreign policy, the legislative process, development, and human rights need to develop methods of working together productively. This requires not only blending different types of expertise but also engaging a wide variety of organizations with different goals and operating cultures. While such types of collaboration are not easy to institute, they are vital to the success of multi-disciplinary reforms such as those required in the security sector.

For such types of collaboration to be effective, external actors need to agree on the policy to be pursued vis-à-vis individual reforming governments. Furthermore, donor governments and multilateral institutions that provide a range of assistance (security, political and development assistance) need to be in agreement internally about the objectives of security sector reform, both conceptually and with regard to activities in specific countries. There have been numerous disconnects within bilateral governments: the financial and political imperatives of arms sales versus the objective of maximizing resources for development; military assistance focusing on improving military-related skills versus human-rights considerations, and so on. While these will never disappear entirely, it is important for governments and multi-task organizations such as the United Nations to discuss the problems in a frank, open manner and to make good-faith efforts to coordinate policies and activities. To facilitate this process, governments and other organizations should have a comprehensive security sector reform policy which outlines the principles underlying assistance for reform and delineates the areas in which the governmental and organizational actors are to be involved.

At the operational level, one method for governments and institutions to achieve internal consensus and consistency is joint vetting of country strategy papers. Another is to develop an inter-agency or inter-departmental process to oversee security sector reform programs. A third is to second staff from one agency to another. The overarching objective would be to develop formal and informal channels of communication that function effectively and to build personal relationships that can transcend departmental or substantive divides.

Similarly, at the international level, the inclusion of security sector reform issues in existing coordination forums and mechanisms, including World Bank-led Consultative Groups and Round Tables led by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), should occur on a priority basis. There also needs to be close cooperation between aid missions and the diplomatic community, including military attachés. Embassies and foreign ministries need to make optimal use of aid missions rather than fencing off security-related issues as so often occurs at present, and development actors need to be open to such collaboration. Regional organizations and consortia of civil society organizations should also be viewed as key partners.

Work to develop the commitment of national leadership

Without the commitment of national leadership to the process, security sector reform will fail. It is not necessary, however, for all relevant governmental actors to favor reform before external actors broach the issue. As long as there are a number of well-placed, influential allies, external actors can do much to increase understanding of the reform process and reduce opposition. In consequence, security sector reform issues should become a regular component of policy dialogue with governments. This dialogue will facilitate the identification of entry points for building support for the reform process. To take one example, ministries of finance are frequently eager to gain control over security force budgets. Discussions of the

improvement of the efficiency of resources devoted to the security sector can provide an excellent entry point for broader discussions of organizational, institutional, and human-resource requirements for transparent, accountable security sectors.

External actors can provide incentives for governments to engage in security sector reform, varying from situation to situation. Some governments may be attracted by the opportunity to work with advisers—especially military and police advisers—from particular OECD countries. Others may accept additional resources to include the security sector in ongoing reform processes, for example in a broad ‘reform of the state’ program or in a more limited effort to strengthen the ministry of finance, the budgeting process, or the ability of legislative committees to function more effectively.

Much donor discourse, however, has focused on conditionality. Such conditionality generally relates to the amount of public expenditure devoted to the military sector in comparison with the social sectors, investment and other priority expenditure categories; limitations on types of military spending (e.g., the elimination of the army’s rice ration in Sierra Leone in 1996/97); or agreements not to raid non-military budget lines for increases in military spending (see the box on Zimbabwe). While these are desirable outcomes, process-oriented conditions would be even more productive. For example, a country where preliminary dialogue has identified a base of support for some degree of security sector reform might be required to include the security sector in public expenditure reviews.

Military spending

“The DRC is covering the bulk of the cost of our military involvement in the DRC, which includes fuel, transport, and ammunition. The outlays borne directly by Zimbabwe’s budget were limited to US\$1.3 million per month in 1998, or 0.4 percent of GDP at an annual rate. Because of the deployment of additional troops, outlays for the DRC campaign will rise to US\$3 million per month in 1999, or 0.6 percent of GDP.

As in 1998, any excess spending over appropriation for 1999 will be met through enforced savings in the military budget on outlays, such as housing and capital expenditure. The unallocated contingency reserve will not be used for this purpose.”

Source: “Memorandum on the Economic Policies of the Government of Zimbabwe for 1999,” Contained in Letter of Intent from Herbert Murerwa, M.P., Minister of Finance, Government of Zimbabwe to Michael Camdessus, Managing Director, IMF, July 16, 1999.

Build on what exists locally and take local ownership seriously

External stakeholders experience a greater degree of success according to the extent to which they avoid imposing specific organizational structures and modes of operation. They must accept that there are different ways to achieve the end-states of transparency, accountability and civil control. The objective should be to empower governments to discover what will work best for them. The South African government, for example, conducted an extensive study of the institutions, organizational structures, legislation, and procedures in other countries before it restructured its security sector. Similarly, the Sierra Leone government educated itself about the security sectors in a number of countries at the beginning of its reform process. Operationally, external actors can provide technical assistance to support efforts to learn about different management systems and structures for the security sector and to plan local reform processes. Where such technical assistance is provided, continuity is extremely important. Local stakeholders are extremely pressed for time to reflect. Conflict-affected countries in particular face a myriad of urgent problems which are very difficult to prioritize as well as a limited number of people with the requisite interest and skills. It is therefore desirable to provide such countries with on-site personnel who can help local stakeholders—in both the public and non-governmental sectors—to focus on issues, identify where assistance is required to move the process along, and gain access to that assistance.

Make ample use of confidence-building activities

Members of the security forces and civilians are often suspicious of each other's motivations and objectives. The former may believe that civilians have no appreciation of security matters and will be unable to make decisions that are in the best interest of the security forces. Where security forces have been involved in human-rights abuses or have pursued economic policies and corrupt practices that have bankrupt a country, leaders of those forces are concerned that they will suffer retribution should civilian opponents gain power. Security force officers who have benefitted personally from opportunities to engage in corrupt behavior may strongly resist the institution of democratic practices and genuine civil oversight.

For their part, civilians who have lived in repressive societies fear the security forces and often find it difficult to interact with them. The fact that they are frequently at a disadvantage in

terms of knowledge of defense and policing matters further adds to the reticence of civilians to interact with representatives of the security forces.

It is therefore critical that external stakeholders proceed cautiously in their interactions with civilian and security-force actors. They should not assume a degree of familiarity or a relationship that exists in many of the OECD countries. It is also critical to structure all activities relating to security sector reform so that they build confidence among local actors.

Take a long-term view

Once embarked upon, it is critical that security sector reform be viewed as a long-term process. Many police advisers, for example, speak of 10- to 15-year reform processes. In reality, the timeframe for institutional reform should probably be calculated in terms of a generation. Some donors are able to make commitments to three-year programs. As institutional development and reform take center stage, it will be preferable to think in terms of five-year, rolling, forward planning cycles. External actors will need to seriously consider at the outset, when contemplating support for security sector reform, whether they are able to make a commitment to an end-state strategy of assisting governments to achieve a sufficient degree of reform so that the changes are sustainable.

Reform in New Democracies

by Laurie Nathan

The challenge of security sector reform in emerging democracies is fundamental for the obvious reason that military, police and intelligence organizations, which may have a critical role in protecting the new order and the rights of citizens, can also subvert those rights and undermine or destroy the democratic project.

This paper considers the challenge with particular reference to the military and to South Africa as a relatively successful case of transformation in the defense sector. It presents a framework for civil-military relations in a democracy, an outline of the South African White Paper on Defence, mechanisms for institutional change, and obstacles to security sector reform.

Civil-military relations

Armed forces by their very nature have tremendous power. This power may be intended to thwart aggression but it may also be misused to interfere in the political process and present a threat to the government and citizens.

The threat can take a number of forms:

- a direct coup in which military officers hold political power;
- a 'silent coup' in which military officers control or manipulate the politicians who formally hold power;
- oppression of citizens, with or without the support of politicians;
- a process of militarization, in terms of which military values come to be regarded as superior to civilian values and are adopted by civil society; and

- the use of armed forces by the government to advance the interests of the ruling party.

These threats are of special concern in countries which are emerging from authoritarian rule and have no entrenched political culture of democratic civil-military relations. New democracies are consequently faced with the challenge of ensuring adequate control over their armed forces in accordance with the following principles.

Civil supremacy over armed forces. The overarching tenet is that the armed forces are subordinate and accountable to the elected and duly appointed civilian authority. The establishment and maintenance of democracy are scarcely possible if soldiers do not accept this principle. The principle entails a distinct hierarchy of authority on military matters, flowing sequentially from the Constitution to the president, the cabinet, the minister of defense and the head of the armed forces. Parliament approves defense legislation and the defense budget, and has powers of supervision and oversight over the armed forces.

Division of responsibility. There is a fundamental distinction between the military and civilian spheres of government, the essence of which is that the armed forces refrain from involvement in politics and from undermining or usurping the authority of government. Conversely, government and opposition groups do not misuse the armed forces to further or prejudice the interests of any political party.

Legality. The armed forces are in every respect subject to the rule of law, and their functions are determined and regulated by law (chiefly the Constitution and the Defence Act). The military conducts operations and preparations for operations strictly within these parameters.

Respect for human rights. Notwithstanding the military's orientation toward the employment of maximum force in situations of hostilities, it is obliged to respect the constitutional rights of citizens and adhere to international humanitarian law in times of war.

Political non-partisanship. If the political process is defined broadly as the exercise and control of power, then the defense force, as an organ of the state, cannot be regarded as apolitical. Nevertheless, it is essential that the military is politically non-partisan. In other words, it may not seek to advance or retard the interests of political parties, whether in government or in opposition. **Accountability.** The principle that all state institutions are accountable to the elected civil authority is especially important in the case of the military because of its capacity to exercise force. Accountability is realized through the supervisory function of the parliamentary defense committee and through the political control exercised by the minister of defense, who is answerable to parliament and the public for the formulation and execution of defense policy. The executive and the armed forces are also accountable for the disbursement of public funds as approved by parliament.

Transparency. Accountability necessarily entails a sufficient degree of transparency and adequate provision of information on defense matters. Formal mechanisms of control and supervision may be frustrated or rendered ineffectual if critical information is absent, incomplete or misleading. Democratic countries address differently the problem of where to draw the line

between the public's right to know and the need for confidentiality in the interests of national security. The principles outlined above are too broad and generic to constitute a sufficient agenda for military reform. The details of that agenda in a given country must reflect the orientation and vision of the new government, its analysis of the problems associated with past security policies, its understanding of security and defense at the conceptual level, and its assessment of current and future threats to security. Transformation may be constrained by compromises that were made in the process of negotiating a political settlement. In short, the policy agenda must address both the general problem of armed forces and the specific dynamics of that country.

The fact that governments invariably deviate from official policy does not detract from the importance of determining a coherent vision and set of objectives and strategies. In the absence of such framework, decision-making will be ad hoc and inconsistent, reforms will lack direction or be non-existent, and parliament and civil society will have no basis for holding government accountable. More specifically, policy on security and defense in emerging democracies will not be transformed in a democratic and anti-militarist direction in the absence of a democratic and anti-militarist agenda.

South Africa's White Paper on Defence

South Africa is one of the few countries in Southern Africa to have developed a comprehensive anti-militarist policy on security and defense. For example, the White Paper on Defence for the Republic of South Africa (1996) seeks deliberately to abandon the aggressive and repressive

strategies of the National Party regime; to bring defense policy into line with international law on armed conflict and with the new democratic dispensation, Bill of Rights and strategic environment in South and Southern Africa; and to reverse the high level of militarization that characterized the apartheid era. The White Paper summarizes the transformation agenda in the form of the following 'principles of defence in a democracy', each of which is explored in some detail:

- National security shall be sought primarily through efforts to meet the political, economic, social and cultural rights and needs of South Africa's people, and through efforts to promote and maintain regional security.
- South Africa shall pursue peaceful relations with other states. It will seek a high level of political, economic and military cooperation with Southern African states in particular.
- South Africa shall adhere to international law on armed conflict and to all international treaties to which it is party.
- The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) shall have a primarily defensive orientation and posture.
- South Africa is committed to the international goals of arms control and disarmament. It shall participate in, and seek to strengthen, international and regional efforts to contain and prevent the proliferation of small arms, conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction.
- South Africa's force levels, armaments and military expenditure shall be determined by defense policy which derives from an analysis of the external and internal security environment, which takes account of the social and economic imperatives of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), and which is approved by parliament.
- The SANDF shall be a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force, capable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently.
- The functions and responsibilities of the SANDF shall be determined by the Constitution and the Defence Act.
- The primary role of the SANDF shall be to defend South Africa against external military aggression. Deployment in an internal policing capacity shall be limited to exceptional circumstances and be subject to parliamentary approval and safeguards.
- The SANDF shall be subordinate and fully accountable to parliament and the executive.
- The SANDF shall operate strictly within the parameters of the Constitution, domestic legislation and international humanitarian law. It shall respect human rights and the democratic political process.
- Defence policy and military activities shall be sufficiently transparent to ensure meaningful parliamentary and public scrutiny and debate, insofar as this does not endanger the lives of military personnel or jeopardize the success of military operations.

- The SANDF shall not further or prejudice party political interests.
- The SANDF shall develop a non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory institutional culture as required by the Constitution.
- The composition of the SANDF shall broadly reflect the composition of South Africa. To this end, affirmative action and equal opportunity programmes will be introduced.
- The SANDF shall respect the rights and dignity of its members within the normal constraints of military discipline and training.

The White Paper adopts a holistic approach to security, emphasizing the security of people and the non-military dimensions of security:

In the new South Africa national security is no longer viewed as a predominantly military and police problem. It has been broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental matters. At the heart of this new approach is a paramount concern with the security of people.

Security is an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being.

At national level the objectives of security policy therefore encompass the consolidation of democracy; the achievement of social justice, economic development and a safe environment; and a substantial

reduction in the level of crime, violence and political instability. At international level the objectives of security policy include the defense of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the South African state, and the promotion of regional security in Southern Africa.

Two critical assumptions underlie this holistic perspective. First, state security is not synonymous with the security of people; in much of the South, the main threat to citizens is their own government. Second, non-military problems like poverty, oppression and environmental degradation present grave threats to the security of people; if these problems are not addressed, they may lead to violent conflict and threaten the security of the state.

This approach has significant implications for strategy and the distribution of state resources. The White Paper argues that the greatest threats to the South African people are socio-economic problems and violent crime rather than the prospect of external aggression. [Accordingly] the RDP is the principal long-term means of promoting the well-being and security of citizens and, thereby, the stability of the country. There is consequently a compelling need to reallocate state resources to the RDP. The challenge is to rationalize the SANDF and contain military spending without undermining the country's core defense capability in the short- or long-term.

The White Paper states explicitly that the new approach to security does not imply an expanded role for the armed forces. Although the SANDF will be employed in a range of secondary tasks, its primary and essential function is defense against external aggression.

The SANDF remains an important security instrument of last resort but it is no longer the dominant security institution. The responsibility for ensuring the security of South Africa's people is now shared by many government departments and ultimately vests in Parliament.

In summary, the White Paper adopts a broad approach to security and a narrow approach to defense. The combined effect is to downgrade the status of the military in the definition of security, the formulation of strategy and the allocation of state funds. Whereas previously 'security' had virtually the same meaning as 'defense', the latter is now seen as a discreet subset of the former.

One of the most striking features of the formulation of new defense policy in South Africa has been the consultative nature of the process. In June 1995 the Minister of Defence published the first draft of the White Paper with an invitation to Parliament and the public to comment thereon. The subsequent draft incorporated proposals from political parties, non-governmental organizations, defense analysts and members of the public. A further three drafts were produced, prior to finalization in May 1996, to accommodate the views of the parliamentary defense committee.

Strategies for reform

In addition to the White Paper, South Africa has addressed (or is in the process of addressing) the transformation of the defense sector through the following measures:

- Constitutional provisions on defense which, *inter alia*, establish the circumstances in which the armed forces may be deployed and the manner in which they must fulfil their functions. The Constitution refers repeatedly to international law and provides that military personnel are obliged to disobey manifestly illegal orders. The Bill of Rights is binding on all organs of state, including the SANDF. The Constitution also provides for the powers and functions of the parliamentary defense committee.
- The drafting of a new Defence Act, Military Discipline Code, and Code of Conduct for Uniformed Personnel.
- A Defence Review which provides for a new force design and will lead to substantial demobilization.
- The establishment of a civilian Defence Secretariat and the transfer to the Secretariat of various functions previously undertaken by Defence Headquarters. The Secretary for Defence has replaced the Chief of the Defence Force as the head of the Department of Defence.
- The introduction of human resource policy dealing with military trade unions; equal opportunity and affirmative action; non-discrimination on grounds of race, ethnicity, gender and sexual orientation; and the abolition of conscription.

- The introduction of a Civic Education Programme to promote awareness and respect amongst military personnel for the “core values of a democratic South Africa”. The program, which applies to all rank levels, covers the key elements of the political process in a democracy; the constitutional provisions on fundamental rights and defense; the significance of the Constitution as supreme law; the principles of democratic civil-military relations; military professionalism in a democracy; international law on armed conflict; and respect for multi-cultural diversity and gender equality.

- Reform of arms export policy, procedures and decision-making processes, with an emphasis on respect for human rights and international peace and security.

Obstacles to security sector reform

The obstacles to security sector reform in emerging democracies are many and varied. They include a lack of vision, expertise and resources; an abiding tendency to view security in an authoritarian and militarist fashion; resistance to reform from politicians and/or military officers; manipulation by foreign powers and neighbouring states; and the on-going politicisation of the security services. The higher the level of political instability and violence in the national or regional arena, the less likely will be reforms in an anti-militarist direction. Further, the formulation of new policy does not lead automatically to acceptance of that policy.

Certain of these obstacles can be grouped in the following overlapping categories.

The problem of complexity

Security sector reform in new democracies can be immensely complex because of the sheer number of policies that have to be transformed, the fact that these policies may have to be changed more or less simultaneously, and the potentially radical nature of the transformation agenda in the light of previous security culture and practice under authoritarian rule. In South Africa, for example, the ‘principles of defense’ outlined above require a dramatic reorientation of defense posture, doctrine and operations; force design; military training and education; institutional culture; defense expenditure, procurement and exports; civil-military relations; and human resource policies.

The management of such complex institutional and policy reform would tax even the most sophisticated of governments. It can appear overwhelming to a new regime that has no prior experience in government.

The problem of expertise

The problem of complexity is compounded by the lack of organizational, managerial, planning, financial and policy expertise within the new government. Leading a liberation movement or guerilla army is hardly comparable with running government departments and conventional security services.

Decision-makers may be entirely unfamiliar with international debates on security and defense and with the range of policy options open to them. They may be daunted by the uncertain consequences of their choice. The more technical a policy and the more radical the required change, the greater the difficulty in this regard. A tendency towards conservatism and reliance on ‘experts’ from the former regime is natural in these circumstances. This tendency might be reinforced by an awareness of the dangers that flow from flawed policies in the security realm.

Parliamentary committees also typically lack expertise on security and defense issues, undermining their oversight and decision-making functions. For example, the defense committee in South Africa accepted the logic of non-offensive defense as a matter of policy but it also accepted the SANDF's recommendation for an offensive force design, mainly because the majority of parliamentarians could not comprehend the technical complexity of the various force design options that were put to them.

The inexperience of defense committees leads to tension between parliamentarians and military officers. The officers privately accuse the parliamentarians of being ignorant and irresponsible, and the Parliamentarians are convinced that the officers deliberately obfuscate matters in order to maintain the status quo.

The problem of capacity

Good governance is not limited to respect for basic rights, pluralism and the other basic features of democracy. It also entails efficiency and effectiveness in fulfilling the functions of the state. These qualities are missing in most African countries, which lack the skills base, expertise, infrastructure and resources to meet the welfare and other security needs of citizens. Without the requisite institutional capacity, the values and principles of democracy cannot be 'operationalized', insecurity remains pervasive, and resort to force by the state and sectors of civil society may consequently be commonplace.

By way of example, many foreign politicians and analysts have expressed concern about the continued deployment of the SANDF in an internal policing role. The concern relates principally to the politicization of the armed forces and the militarization of law and order. These considerations are well-known to a South African audience and are spelled out in the White Paper on Defence.

Yet the practical problem of an inefficient, corrupt and poorly trained police service, unable to cope with violent crime, necessitates military deployment.

By way of further example, adherence to the rule of law presupposes the existence of a competent and fair judiciary, police service and criminal justice system; the expectation that police respect human rights is unrealistic if they have not been trained in techniques other than use of force; democratic civil-military relations rest not only on the disposition of the armed forces but also on the proficiency of departments of defense and parliamentary defense committees; and illegal trafficking in small arms will not be stemmed through policy and legislative measures if governments are unable to control their arsenals and borders.

The building of capacity in these and other areas is a long-term and complicated endeavor. If, in the interim, governance is weak and insecurity abounds, the country may be vulnerable to a coup.

The problem of resistance to change

Members of the security services may oppose reforms for a host of ideological and political reasons. Moreover, profound institutional and policy transformation is inherently threatening and would give rise to resistance and conflict in any circumstances. This is especially the case in respect of conventional armed forces which tend to be conservative because they view their ultimate function as defending the status quo against illegitimate change.

In South Africa the process of transforming the armed forces has been hindered by what many ANC leaders regard as racism or a counter-revolutionary agenda. Yet it is important to understand the extent to which resistance to change stems from less sinister motives. Officers who previously served under apartheid are expected to implement new policies that are at odds with their training, education and experience over several decades. Policy allowing the formation of military trade unions, for example, is in conflict with their basic instincts as soldiers. Opposition to the policy is based on the conviction that trade unions will undermine military discipline and effectiveness. Similarly, opposition to a non-offensive defense posture may derive not from aggressive intentions but from a professional orientation to protect the country without undue restriction.

Military resistance to trade unions, disarmament and non-offensive defense might of course be found in stable as well as in emerging democracies. But in the case of the latter, a considerable number of new policies may represent wholly new paradigms. In South Africa these include a regional approach based on common security and confidence- and security-building measures, international humanitarian law, equal opportunity and affirmative action, soldiers' rights as citizens, transparency, accountability and parliamentary oversight, and much more.

The problem of insecurity

To a great extent, militarization in African countries is a product of structural conditions which constitute a crisis for human security and/or the stability of the state. These conditions create a security vacuum which states, civil society groups and individuals seek to fill through the use of violence, sometimes in an organized and sustained fashion and at other times in

a spontaneous and sporadic manner. The prospect of disarmament in these circumstances is extremely limited.

While the primary problem of authoritarianism may be largely resolved with the introduction of democracy, other structural problems continue to pose obstacles to disarmament. If people are hungry and have negligible economic opportunity, then some of them will turn to crime and banditry as a means of subsistence. If the state is too weak to maintain law and order, then criminal activity will flourish; communities, and in some instances states, may privatize security. And if states lack the institutional capacity to resolve the normal political and social conflicts that characterize all societies, then at least some individuals and groups will settle their disputes through violence.

At the most fundamental level, demilitarization depends on the resolution of national crises and the establishment of good governance as defined earlier. In mainstream disarmament circles, a positive causal relationship is posited between disarmament, development and security. In reality, the positive causal relationship is between good governance, security and disarmament.

Conclusion

There are no 'quick fix' solutions to the problem of security sector reform in new democracies. The international community should avoid the assumption that northern models can be replicated easily or, indeed, that these models are appropriate in every respect to conditions elsewhere. Principles which are taken for granted in the North are radical in countries emerging from authoritarian rule, and

the institutional capacity which is taken for granted in the North may be entirely absent.

The difficulties and obstacles related to formulating and implementing new policy on security and defense are substantial, and success is unlikely to be attained if reforms are not shaped and embraced by the new government, civil society and the security institutions themselves.

The agenda for democracy and disarmament, promoted by countries of the North, is constantly undermined by the failure of these countries to adhere to their professed values. For several decades they supported dictators and rebel movements engaged in terrorism; they frequently seek to impose positions on developing states; they remain massively over-armed; they flout, or ignore violations of, arms embargoes and other sanctions regimes imposed by the UN Security Council; and they export armaments in a highly irresponsible manner. The endless flow of arms from the North to the South is not the primary cause of civil wars but it enables the combatants to sustain hostilities and inflict massive damage on civilian populations. Security reform is as much a challenge in the North as in the South.

Programs for the Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Changing Perspectives in Development and Security

by **Bernd Hoffmann and
Colin Gleichmann**

Introduction

Armed conflicts, civil wars and the militarization of societies continue to have a disastrous effect on economic and social development in many parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America. In the first half of the 1990s regional peace initiatives and global disarmament led to a number of peace accords which stipulated procedures for the controlled reduction of troops and the economic reintegration of former combatants. Special programs for the demobilization and reintegration of combatants have been widely recognized as a key factor in peace building.

Demobilization of armies and economic reintegration programs for veterans are not a new phenomenon. The developed nations in particular have implemented policies for adjusting their fighting forces and labor

forces to the different war and peacetime requirements. The new quality of demobilization programs, as they were designed for Africa and Latin America in the 1990s, is the strong involvement of multinational agencies with a clear development orientation. While traditional demobilization has primarily served the interests of one national army by providing post-war prospects for veterans, the new approaches in demobilization have developed around United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations and post-war reconstruction programs. Now, more than 10 years after the cold war, it is often forgotten that these programs only became possible when assistance to former guerrilla fighters

was no longer a question of political alliance but of peace building and economic development. Political disengagement since the end of the cold war has left a vacuum, with new challenges for development agencies. The new field lies between that of development and security.

The shift toward a development focus in demobilization has been most apparent in Africa. While the 1989–90 peace process in Namibia was managed without a special program for ex-combatants, the collapse of the Ethiopian state and army in 1991 sparked off a number of development programs for the reintegration of ex-combatants. For many development agencies, including the German Agency for Development Cooperation (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, GTZ), this marked their first active involvement in this field.

The early experiences with development-oriented demobilization programs have been analyzed by a number of organizations. Establishing itself as a major donor in this sector, the World Bank compared programming and cost factors in several African countries (Colletta, 1996). Conceptual guidelines for implementing agencies and partner countries have been published by the World Bank (Colletta, 1996), the GTZ (GTZ, 1997) and the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO, 1999), and a number of research institutes have analyzed the impact of demobilization programs on regional peace building and social development. Over the years a better understanding of the implications of these programs has been established and a 'standard' has evolved. We can now look back and evaluate some of the intended and unintended results of demobilization and reintegration programs (DRPs).

The rationale for demobilization and reintegration programs

Demobilization and reintegration programs consist of measures designed to facilitate the transition from a war economy to productive peacetime development. Initiated by the downsizing or disbanding of armed forces, these programs affect both the institutional set-up of the defence sector and the livelihoods of former combatants and their families. The long-term goal of reintegration programs for ex-combatants is to utilize their human potential and make them productive citizens. Although many of the DRP activities take place in the field of rural development, the structural change that initiates these programs takes place in the defence sector.

The motivations for granting special assistance to former soldiers and resistance fighters are often better explained by potential threats than by the special needs of this group. In an immediate post-war situation the individual needs of veterans or demobilized soldiers are not appreciably different from those of returning refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). These groups of people usually need shelter, food, medical support and land. The similarities in immediate reintegration needs are often mirrored in similar program elements and resettlement packages for those groups. More often than not it is the political situation that calls for targeted assistance to ex-combatants. Political agreements on power-sharing and the merging of several armed groups into a new army cannot be implemented without offering a solution for those combatants who are to be discharged from their respective armies. By creating economic opportunities for

ex-combatants, DRPs usually provide recognition for the years in the armed forces and for political loyalty. In many countries DRPs have to fill the gap between the political promises of a peace deal and the harsh economic reality of a post-war country. Therefore, any economic development incentive under a DRP has a political agenda—as do the state bodies that implement these programs.

DRPs are not implemented through line-ministries but through a civilian commission that will be dissolved at the end of the program. Donors have welcomed such a temporary set-up because it reduces the administrative costs of the immediate program. DRP commissions should represent the different warring factions or the government and opposition in order to guarantee a political balance. Officially, these commissions are charged with ensuring the fair political and social integration of ex-combatants at all levels of government and by coordinating donor programs. Their special mandate, however, has regularly been a cause of their weakness when they have been boycotted by one party to the peace agreement (e.g. in Angola) or when their efforts have been hampered by a lack of funds and implementing structures.

Especially after civil wars, DRPs are burdened by high expectations for results in peace building, social justice and reconciliation. By subjugating combatants from all the enemy factions to the same procedures of registration, disarmament and discharge and by offering a uniform package of recognition and benefits, the programs are often considered crucial for a policy of national

reconciliation that helps to overcome past divisions and discrimination in society. The reality in many countries, however, shows that this is not necessarily the case. A DRP may constitute an important building block in a national program but, with its focus on former combatants, its reintegration components have greater limitations than many other sector-specific policies in a post-war situation. DRPs should reflect a policy of integration toward both sides to a conflict (often the winners and losers of a war) but they will fail all expectations if they are charged with redistributing a share of the economic wealth (most often land) that a certain group has previously been denied. Issues that have been at the centre of the conflict (e.g. access to land, education and government positions) can usually not be resolved by DRPs. The reasons for this lie in their short-term, specific mandates.

Assessments of DRPs and of the demobilization elements of peacekeeping operations often overlook the military function of demobilization and reintegration. Simultaneously with the discharge of veterans, the army or security sector must be reorganized. Such decisions fall under the authority of the army command, but security sector reform must be closely related to programs for demobilized combatants. As long as demobilization is conducted as part of a United Nations peacekeeping operation, this dual function might well be under one administration. However, in many of the programs that started in peacetime this dual demobilization role has often been neglected. The effects of this focus are discussed in this paper.

Program elements

An integral part of the professional standard that development agencies, international financial institutions (IFIs) and UN agencies share is the demand for a basic set of strategic elements in any demobilization and reintegration process:

Demobilization

- **Planning:** From the peace plan to contingency planning and security issues
- **Encampment:** Massing of combatants in specially designated assembly areas
- **Registration:** Registration of combatants' bio-data and registration of arms
- **Disarmament:** Collection, control and disposal of light weapons and ammunition
- **Pre-Discharge Orientation:** Informing combatants about their rights and entitlements, public health campaigns for HIV
- **Discharge:** Formally documented discharge of the military

The process of demobilization should take place on a contractual or statutory basis at stipulated places and within a limited timeframe, which requires the full consent and cooperation of all the parties to either a peace agreement or a downsizing plan. Crucial demobilization tasks (e.g. registration, disarmament and formal discharge) fall under the authority of the military, be it UN military officers or the national forces that are to be downsized and disarmed.

Reintegration

- **Reinsertion:** Transport to final destination; food and household supplies for the immediate needs of a maximum of six months; special assistance to disabled, chronically ill and aged veterans
- **Resettlement assistance:** Shelter assistance, building materials
- **Agricultural assistance:** Agricultural input, training, extension services, land use planning, irrigation.
- **Employment opportunities:** Labor-intensive public works programs, skills training, small credit, business training
- **Community development:** Food-for-work programs, development of light infrastructure, support for local reintegration processes.

Reinsertion and long-term reintegration programs are the core of many DRP commissions' mandates as they cooperate entirely with civilian partners. The timeframe and the details of implementation differ from country to country according to the political situation, institutions involved, local bureaucratic traditions and funds available.

DRP target groups

The target groups for demobilization and reintegration programs are often a negative selection from the military. The first to leave the army are the wounded, disabled, chronically ill and aged. In those countries where a new army is constituted not solely on the basis of political quotas, formal qualifications and military skills will be used as the recruitment criteria, with the result that those soldiers with few formal qualifications and skills will be excluded. In the process of transforming a guerrilla force into a professional statutory army, many countries exclude women. International

conventions also ban the recruitment of minors under the age of 18 years. All these criteria result in a target group that is diverse in age, social status, gender, ethnic identity and educational background. There is no standard set of needs that all ex-combatants have in common. Most demobilized combatants are vulnerable and need special assistance in addition to standard economic reintegration benefits. Some of the veterans are permanently unable to support themselves. Consequently, the benefits of DRPs must be directed not only to the individual but also to the ex-combatant's household and to the communities which support the reintegration locally.

In many countries special programs have been designed to help groups specifically affected by the war and subsequent demobilization.

Child soldiers

The recruitment of children and youth as combatants in armed conflicts is not a new phenomenon, although it is becoming increasingly clear that this practice is taking on alarming proportions. The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) estimates that over 300 000 child soldiers were serving in national armies or irregular armed groups by the end of the 1990s. The active participation of minors in violent conflicts was documented for 36 conflicts in 1998. In 28 cases, child soldiers were registered who were under 15 years of age.

In the military, children are assigned many kinds of duties, ranging from those of cooks and messengers to spies and full combat duties. As combatants, children are not only victims of war but also among the perpetrators. They are used directly and

indirectly in all fields of war activity. In some cases, children are deliberately sent ahead in suicide squads or to clear minefields. They are considered particularly fearless because they are unable to correctly assess the dangers in battle situations, a quality deliberately reinforced by the use of drugs and alcohol. Many are kidnapped into armed groups but for others the military has an attraction: when all the social systems break down, the military appears to have power and resources. As combatants, children can support their families or transcend the limitations of age and class.

Alongside active demobilization, the reintegration of former child soldiers requires special measures. Most importantly, they must undergo a process of socio-cultural reintegration, including physical and psychological rehabilitation. Reintegration into a family and a community structure can both give these children a sense of security and exercise a form of social control. Second, they must receive schooling, skills training and transitional assistance so that as young adults they can support themselves and their families.

Even more than for adults, assistance to youth traumatized by war must be tailored to their specific experiences and should be based on the cultural values of the local society. The successful programs are based in the local community, and national DRPs should take this into account. How successfully under-age ex-combatants are able to reintegrate depends crucially on the extent to which they succeed in developing positive life prospects and occupying a permanent place in civil society.

Recognizing the importance of children and youth in the process of reconciliation and reconstruction, the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

(Bundesministerium für Zusammenarbeit, BMZ) and the GTZ are currently designing a new strategy to include young adults and children in development programs. For the first time, children and youth will be target groups for development cooperation. In this context, ‘demobilization and social reintegration’ is defined as one of eight domains for cross-cutting and multi-sectoral project approaches.

Female ex-combatants

In many cultures, the reintegration of female ex-combatants is more difficult and complex than that of male ex-combatants. In their role as guerrilla fighters or soldiers, women experience a much greater degree of social and economic freedom than they do in traditional societies. They assume responsibility and command in crucial sectors of the military and the war economy, but when the war is over their social roles change again as female combatants are often discharged from the army. This can lead to conflicts in the integration of women. Many demobilized women soldiers also experience difficulties in establishing themselves economically, since they lack knowledge and experience in for example agriculture. Their social status is low and their rights are inadequately protected, for example when they assert claims on property and land. In Eritrea, where women constituted about 30 percent of the guerrilla force, special programs were set up. Women were offered skills training in various trades, workshop and market facilities were built for them, and daycare centres were built for the children of women who had been active in the liberation struggle, allowing them to work fulltime.

Reconciliation at the community level

Reintegration is a long-term social and economic process. For those ex-combatants who settle in rural communities, the scope of their opportunities depends on their reception by the local people, regardless of whether they re-enter the community as ex-combatants or enter as new arrivals. Post-war communities are divided, still coping with war wounds and memories, so conflicts persist even after the fighting has ceased. Ex-combatants settle next to returning refugees, IDPs and a local population that has also suffered from the war.

Experience from DRPs shows that targeted support to communities facilitates not only reintegration but also reconciliation as a whole. At the level below a national peace agreement it is the individual’s sense of security that defines trust in the peace and in new neighbours. In many cultures cleansing rituals and procedures for reconciliation between elders or religious leaders is a way of reuniting communities. These processes should be supported and recognized at a level above the community level. The individual’s sense of security is also strongly influenced by disarmament, through weapons collection campaigns targeted at private households. Even after demobilization, ex-combatants are more likely than the rest of the population to have access to light weapons, and this fact alone creates fear.

DRPs do not solve the social problems or ethnic tensions that initially led to the violent conflicts and wars. Land distribution and land titling must be tackled on a national and a legal basis. Reintegration benefits for ex-combatants should be designed so that prevailing conflicts are not intensified.

The role of development agencies

In immediate post-war situations, DRPs often coincide with national programs for the repatriation of refugees and IDPs, the reconstitution of social services and the reconstruction of basic infrastructure. In these situations the role of development agencies emerges directly from the emergency aid programs. The management of assembly areas, the procurement of food, shelter and medical support, and independent monitoring of the registration process are typical fields of involvement for development agencies during the first two stages (registration and demobilization). There is a tendency to outsource tasks in this field to either specialized agencies under contract from a national body or a multinational organization. The areas of specialization are camp management, camp security, disarmament, logistics and monitoring.

The role of development agencies is particularly prominent in reinsertion and reintegration programs. Reinsertion is a short stage of the program that includes resettlement in the home village and often a 'start-up kit' of cash and in-kind benefits designed to support ex-combatants and their families for several months. The reintegration component may consist of several elements designed to reach different target groups. Reintegration programs for ex-combatants usually cover a wide range of economic and social fields: agricultural inputs, skills training, public works, small credits and business promotion. The important task in this phase is to link reintegration programs with other programs for sustainable development. The link is not only conceptual; many programs that were initially exclusively

for ex-combatants are also opening up for several other groups of beneficiaries with similar needs.

The strengths of tailor-made development assistance for DRPs lie in the focus on and understanding of special target groups. Several crucial issues of post-war situations have been taken up successfully in the development programs of bilateral development agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and churches—such issues as child soldiers, female fighters and reconciliation at the community level. Special programs have been designed to support those groups with special needs during demobilization.

It has been observed that in many countries, soon after DRPs are agreed as national policy, their political and technical elements are separated (Bendaña, 1999, p. 76). The technical elements of implementation are the responsibility of bi- and multilateral donors and NGOs. However, there has been a growing demand for assistance at the policy-formulation level in this field. Since most DRPs rely heavily on donor funding, donors prioritize policies that benefit the country as a whole and link national demobilization efforts to policies in other sectors. The most obvious links are those to reform of social services, including pension schemes and the health system. In most countries, however, donors have ignored the importance of comprehensive security sector reform. Usually, technical and humanitarian assistance is not coordinated with military cooperation.

Coordination between national institutions and donors

At the end of a war there is usually consensus between the national government and donors on the necessity for a DRP in order to stem the risk of marauding troops and relieve the government budget of the burden of high defence expenditures.

However, when the interests and intended impacts of donors and governments are compared, differences come to light. For governments of post-war societies, these programs are a political instrument through which loyalties can be created and groups perceived as potential enemies can be pacified. Donors emphasize the economic potential of ex-combatants and their political neutralization, serving joint macro-economic interests.

However, divergences emerge in the details of implementation, considerably delaying these processes. The transfer of external resources may become a driving force behind a government's interest in such a program and related reforms or may bring the machinery to a halt. Development banks and bilateral donors gear their inputs to development targets that affect society as a whole, for example budgetary reform and democratization, and attach conditions to their financial inputs. The political agenda of such programs, on the other hand, is determined by factors of domestic policy. The ethnic and political identities of the demobilized and factions within the military and the bureaucracy constitute the key determining criteria for the selection of target groups and for the design of the program.

During an unstable post-war situation, short-term gains are more important than the prospects offered by a long-term plan for prosperity. Unrealistic promises of land and employment, large cash payments to veterans or the simple delay of demobilization are some of the most common phenomena. While keeping soldiers under arms is costly, many governments may see this solution as less risky and cheaper than sending soldiers home and borrowing money to

pay their discharge benefits. Donors have to understand the logic of these policy options, which often take security interests into account rather than fiscal or micro-economic factors.

The relationship between advisory services and financing

Donors have attached more importance to the financing of reintegration packages than to providing advisory services to the institutions involved. Their aim is to implement programs quickly, wherever possible through institutions that can be dissolved once demobilization has been completed. Rapid integration of ex-combatants into civilian settings and demilitarization of state structures to strengthen rural development may make sense in terms of development policy, but for these countries' governments the problems of implementation are not solely of a financial nature. The programs have far-reaching consequences for the organization of the army and for the security policy of the country.

In a program in Cambodia, all the soldiers were for the first time systematically registered in a database. Previously, the government had access to information only on the commanders of individual units. When such programs are planned and implemented, the question arises of how large an army should be. The tasks of the army need to be redefined on the basis of a security sector analysis which examines all the threats to national security, whether from other states or from natural disasters. Determination of the strength, training and equipment needs of the army should be based on this analysis. In many countries these reforms also require a review of the army's legal basis.

Many armies fragmented by civil war cannot master reforms relevant to security policy without professional and long-term advisory services. If the army is not properly involved in planning the DRP, this can result in uncertainty and a reluctance to carry out necessary reforms. The temptation can then become all the greater to divert a portion of the external resources for reintegration programs into other channels. What in the donors' eyes is a clear case of corruption is tolerated by the recipient governments as a political compromise and compensatory payment. In post-conflict countries, the conditionality of international financial institutions' loans for programs is often linked to fiscal discipline. Reforms in the security sector have to be made in advance. If the army does not feel sufficiently well-treated, there may be a delay in the provision of financing, although donors negotiate and plan their activities not with the army but primarily with the ministries for finance and welfare. Most IFIs and bilateral agencies simply lack a mandate for cooperation with the military. Therefore, most agencies do not have a concept for security sector reform and how such a reform affects development programs.

The effects of demobilization programs

Economic benefits

Both the macro- and micro-economic effects of DRPs have been measured. At the micro-economic level it is obvious that ex-combatants in most countries have benefited from targeted assistance by DRPs and in general have

understood how to utilize the short-term benefits of these programs to establish their own livelihoods. A small number of ex-combatants will even do better than the average person in the society because they can build on political networks and privileges from the war. However, some ex-combatants will fail to manage the transition from a war economy to the harshness of a market economy. Unemployment among ex-combatants is above the average in most countries, although this is not a surprising trend for a group that is so diverse, traumatized and limited in its development potential by the war. In most countries war veterans and ex-combatants do not belong to the most productive economic groups. Again, the selection of beneficiaries and target groups in these programs is visibly politically motivated, not motivated by development indicators.

The World Bank has shown in a number of detailed studies how the economic reintegration of the individual ex-combatant benefits the national economy (Colletta, 1996a, p. 20), measured not only by the individual's contribution to the GNP and potential tax revenues but also by the overall economic gains from improved security in the country.

Social benefits

A generalization that can be made from these studies is that the overall macro-economic gain resulting from reintegration programs is less relevant than the political stabilization that these programs bring about. At the individual level this translates into social recognition and finally into social capital. Traditional programs for veterans of wars of liberation found ways to translate recognition into not only pensions but also medals, celebrations and many small but visible privileges in public life. A modern,

more integrative DRPs has to work without the attraction of such publicly visible results. After civil wars there are often no positive memories that can be exploited to boost the social capital of ex-combatants. Positive associations with demobilization grow at the community level since it is in the families and communities where reconciliation is put into practice and where people with different backgrounds seize the opportunities of a common ground. These factors, however, are difficult to measure.

Impacts on security

The primary aim of DRPs is to reduce the risk of marauding ex-combatants by offering sustainable economic alternatives on an individual or a collective basis. Assessed at the level of the individual, most programs have managed to provide alternatives for the majority of the ex-combatants. What impact does this have on the security situation of a country? This is also difficult to measure. The linkages between demobilization and security issues have not yet been researched sufficiently, but some observations can be made.

Recent studies have connected demobilization and the disbanding of armed forces to development of the private security industry (Lock, 1999). In Southern and Central Africa, where the majority of countries have implemented demobilization and army reforms, many of the officers who were discharged are now offering their know-how and services on the open market of the region. The proliferation of arms from Eastern Europe has facilitated this market. The customers are companies that want to protect their assets and governments in

need of military support. The freeing of these resources has contributed to regional destabilization and fragmentation. The larger private security companies also offer their services on other continents. At the local and regional levels many ex-combatants might be drafted again by a new military force to fight in a new conflict.

A critical review of the unintended impacts of DRPs should also study those countries that have implemented demobilization successfully but later become involved in a new war. Rwanda and Uganda have both implemented donor-funded demobilization programs after internal wars and prior to large-scale military engagement in neighboring countries. A similar pattern can be seen in Ethiopia and Eritrea; both countries run large, effective programs for the veterans of their respective armies. What role did these programs play in the new hostilities that have erupted between the two countries? Those ex-combatants who were handicapped and ill have probably resettled and not been remobilized into the army, and most of the able ex-combatants might not be eager to go to the front again. Questions arise, however, about an army's ability to reconstitute itself when it has been relieved of the burden of surplus combatants by the donor community. Other effects might become visible when the next demobilization is due and the international community has to decide whether or not to establish a similar program.

In such an assessment the individual and the collective levels must be differentiated. An acceptable settlement or employment solution for the individual combatant does not necessarily translate into improved security at the national or regional level. Many countries settled their ex-

combatants in special villages, situated along a border or in strategic areas controlled by the military. Colonial armies had a long tradition of such defense villages in Africa, and plantations run by the army and veteran smallholders are a common feature of many South-East Asian economies. These settlements can serve several purposes. Some locations might be chosen for strategic purposes, others for the simple reason that the army occupied the land at the end of a war. Donors have consistently refused to fund such settlements wherever strategic implications were apparent.

We clearly need better indicators to assess the impact of DRPs on the security sector. A stable security situation is a prime factor for development. This is the main reason why development agencies have entered the DRP field. An assessment of the impact of DRPs on the security situation in a country should therefore be part of any such program.

Toward common standards

Although demobilization and reintegration programs for ex-combatants have become a standard feature of post-war reconstruction programs throughout the world, no international agency or body has been established to create a common standard or to coordinate the activities of donors. Within the UN system, responsibilities have shifted many times between different agencies and peacekeeping operations. This led not to programs that were based on those carried out in another country but to those resulting from the peace talks and UN operations.

Lessons learned from previous programs clearly illustrate the need for a common standard in demobilization. Following an evaluation of UN operations, the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations is currently developing a training manual to be used in the training of military personnel involved in demobilization, disarmament and reintegration during peacekeeping operations. A standardized curriculum will be used by military training institutions throughout the world and should make international peacekeeping operations more effective.

Recognizing the close relationship between humanitarian assistance and security issues, the British Department for International Development (DFID) has commissioned studies on security sector reform.

A number of other DRP-related issues need further research and clarification. The work of international human rights tribunals, for example, has implications for the impunity of former military personnel. In those countries where demobilization programs and human rights tribunals operate simultaneously, the legal framework and boundaries must be clearly defined. In most countries demobilization programs have stipulated or assumed that ex-combatants cannot be tried for war crimes.

With more IFIs extending their mandate to humanitarian assistance and demobilization programs, the security implications of these large, multilaterally funded programs must be included in the risk analysis.

A challenge for all the agencies and governments involved will be to develop better indicators of the long-term effect of DRPs. Only several years after demobilization can we ascertain whether DRPs have achieved their goal and contributed to sustainable peace and development.

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Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs as a Means to Prevent Deadly Conflict

by Peggy Mason

Introduction: United Nations experience in peace operations

The focus of this paper is on the contribution that programs for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DD&R) of ex-combatants can make not only in post-conflict environments—where they are usually applied—but also in pre-conflict situations as a development strategy for helping to prevent deadly conflict. The paper defines DD&R and the key for its effective planning and implementation and discusses whether they might apply to a pre-conflict development context. The paper is concluded by a brief consideration of some of the main impediments to the implementation of preventive strategies.

The analysis is based on studies of DD&R mainly in a post-conflict peacekeeping environment (see, for example, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), 1997; Mason, 1999). Aspects of DD&R have been examined in virtually every type of United Nations-sanctioned peace support operation, including demobilization efforts by the

United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) and a regional mechanism, the International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV/OAS), established by the Organization of American States, which was responsible for the civilian aspects of the DD&R of the Contras in Honduras and Nicaragua. In Cambodia, disarmament and demobilization took place in the context of the implementation of a comprehensive peace settlement by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). In Somalia, the absence of a disarmament mandate led to ad hoc disarmament by the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF), acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to restore peace and stability (UNIDIR, 1995). In Eastern Slavonia, the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) carried out both demilitarization in respect of paramilitary groups and disarmament of the general public in the lead-up to that area's return to Croatian government control (Mason, 1998, pp. 91–97). In Sierra Leone, even as a regional peacekeeping force—the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)—was still fighting the main body of rebels, implementation of a national DD&R plan was attempted under UN

monitoring in respect of a group of surrendered fighters, as a possible inducement to others to lay down their arms.

This template used here to help determine what would have been needed for DD&R to have been fully successful in each of these cases, often in stark contrast to what actually happened is what may be called the 'best case' scenario—a *comprehensive* United Nations peacekeeping mission of the type envisaged in the early post-Cold War missions in Namibia to a certain extent and much more so in the cases of Mozambique and Cambodia. Their aim was the implementation, with international military and civilian assistance, of a comprehensive peace settlement that would address all the elements necessary for a sustainable peace. While the peace agreement could not, in and of itself, 'resolve' all the outstanding problems, ideally it could lay the foundation—the framework—for the establishment of legitimate, democratic institutions and processes that, in due time, would be capable of peacefully addressing the outstanding issues and managing future differences without violence. This was the theory, at least, and arguably more or less the actual practice in at least some cases although, more often than not, what was achieved 'on the ground' fell far short of expectations.

The Paris Agreements—signed in late October 1991 and the product of a decade-long diplomatic effort by the four factions in Cambodia and 18 other countries, including the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the then six members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Viet Nam—mandated UNTAC to “exercise power in political, military, economic and other functional domains, ranging from the organizing and conducting of elections to coordinating the

repatriation of Cambodian refugees; from disarming and demobilizing military forces of warring parties to guaranteeing the Cambodian people's human rights; from coordinating a major program of economic and financial support for rehabilitation and reconstruction to stopping outside military assistance and verifying the total withdrawal of foreign forces" (UNIDIR, 1996a, p. 13; United Nations, 1995).

Such unprecedented authority for a United Nations peacekeeping mission was heralded as a "systematic effort at nation-building" (UNIDIR, 1996b, p. 4). The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was not mandated to assume direct control of certain aspects of the civil administration, as had been the case with UNTAC in Cambodia. It was nevertheless responsible for supervising the overall implementation of a comprehensive peace settlement, including the DD&R of ex-combatants into civil society, the return of refugees and displaced persons, oversight of elections, and an extensive focus on the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the Mozambican economy. One of the most interesting—and successful— aspects of this mission was the role it played in helping transform the rebel opposition force (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, RENAMO) into a fully functioning political party, able to both contest the election and accept the resulting victory of Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO).

The difficulties with implementation of the comprehensive approach are manifold and have been extensively studied in several case studies (UNIDIR, 1996b). Perhaps first and foremost among the reasons for the difficulties has been the lack of resources (both human and financial) to do the mandated job. Surely the most egregious example of the gap between commitment and resources is that of Angola and the UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), resulting in the launching of a special

international appeal to avoid starvation among ex-combatants in the Assembly Areas. The appalling living conditions led to widespread desertion of fighters under arms. Equally serious, the tiny UN force lacked the capacity to protect the fighters of the disarmed opposition (Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola, UNITA, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) once they left the camps. The resulting failure of the disarmament and demobilization effort left UNITA with its military options still open. Its leader, Savimbi, promptly relaunched the war when his party lost the election. Many believe that this failure to capitalize on the genuine desire of the rank and file of UNITA fighters to lay down their arms through a properly funded demobilization program represented the loss of an opportunity, which has not reappeared (Anstee, 1996).

A very serious 'turf' or jurisdictional problem persists between peacekeeping (the primary preserve of the UN Security Council) and development (under the auspices of the General Assembly and therefore not funded from the peacekeeping budget). Even the peacekeeping budget is not controlled by the Security Council. While it can authorize the mission and its components, the budget must be approved by the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly and can only include non-development-related items. The financing for all the development-related activities of the mission must be raised through an entirely separate—voluntary—process of funding appeals. This divided authority has made it more difficult both to regularly secure sufficient resources to implement a comprehensive settlement and to coordinate the diverse range of UN actors, some within and many outside the mission budget, regardless of the countless other non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

and aid agencies operating independently of UN auspices. A possible forum for forging consensus on a broader definition of mission-funded activities, the Fourth or Special Political Committee, which produces an annual report on peacekeeping-related issues, has to date demonstrated mainly antipathy toward such notions as peace building.

Another serious problem has been the lack of a long-term commitment to the peace implementation process, with a mission mandate of six months' duration becoming the norm and the issue of extension often left hanging until the very last moment, with consequent negative implications for staffing and continuity. It is salutary to note that this was not always so. In the case of Mozambique, for example, the original one-year mandate of ONUMOZ was extended for an additional year and a new election date was set to allow demobilization to be substantially completed before the election took place. This extension was due in large measure to the lessons learned from UNAVEM II in Angola, where the original election timetable was maintained despite the fact that little demobilization had been achieved. In the words of the UN Blue Book on Mozambique, "It was apparent to all concerned that Mozambique's planned elections should not take place until the military aspects of the Agreement had been implemented. This conclusion was reinforced by the events following Angola's elections in the preceding weeks; there, the failure to complete demobilization had enabled the loser of the election to launch an all-out war" (United Nations, 1995a, p. 26).

The lack of follow-on arrangements—the presence of which might have mitigated some of the problems caused by unduly short peacekeeping mission mandates—further undermined the successful implementation of a comprehensive strategy. In Cambodia, for example,

while the elections were held successfully, neither disarmament nor demobilization was complete and the process of reconstruction had barely begun when UNTAC's mandate was formally terminated. This is one area where progress has now been made and the Security Council has been increasingly willing, upon termination of the military mission, to authorize a follow-on security presence composed solely of civilian police (as was done in the case of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium with UNTAES). One of the deleterious effects of an unduly short mandate was a focus on elections as the exit strategy for the mission. This strategy surely reached its zenith in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it was necessary to hold the elections within the initial one-year mandate of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) (IISS, 1997, p. 136). The successful completion of elections was asserted as positive proof that democratization had been achieved regardless of the state of institutional underpinning necessary to sustain democracy. This approach tended to compound, rather than ameliorate, a key weakness of emerging democracies—their tendency to encourage highly adversarial political processes, mass participatory action and extremely high expectations well in advance of any capacity for effective governance.

Other problems were related to the lack of organizational capacity, permanent planning staff and standing operational headquarters in the United Nations to effectively manage operations on the scale of UNTAC or ONUMOZ. Many of these deficiencies had begun to be corrected, however, as the organization gradually reoriented itself from management of a small number of relatively stable first-generation missions to an increasing number of multi-dimensional operations. The real stumbling block came in the form of peace

operations where there was no peace to keep. The significant difficulties encountered in Somalia by the US-led coalition (UNITAF) and its successor, the UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), and by the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia have all but obliterated the very real achievements of the earlier UN missions that were mandated and at least partially equipped to implement a comprehensive peace settlement. In this regard, it is to be hoped that the Sierra Leone peacekeeping mission, authorized in 1999, may mark a modest renewal of Security Council interest in taking a more forthcoming approach to peace operations involving the United Nations on the African continent.

Despite this litany of shortcomings in the execution of the strategy, the fact remains that the initial aim was a comprehensive approach, seeking to put in place mechanisms to address root causes and to manage differences by peaceful, inclusive means. As originally conceived, the early post-Cold War UN-led interventions conducted in the wake of violent conflict were not fixated on the short-term goals of conflict management or mitigation but sought to facilitate a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution based on sound development principles. It is this comprehensive approach that is required in the planning and implementation of DD&R in a peacekeeping environment.

DD&R defined and key principles identified¹

Post-conflict demobilization is the process by which armed forces (government and/or opposition or factional forces) are either downsized or completely disbanded as part of a broader transformation from war to peace. Demobilization typically involves the assembly, disarmament, administration and discharge of former combatants, who receive some form of compensation package and/or

assistance. In parallel with, or subsequent to, the demobilization process, a unified national defense force is often created, composed of an agreed percentage of former members of the government and opposition forces. The aim here is to create a professional, well-trained military force, firmly under civilian control, that is inclusive rather than factional, and with a size, mission and budget in keeping with the needs and resources of the country it is intended to serve.

Neither the 'civilianization' of former fighters nor the reform of the military is an easy task. However, they are essential, urgent tasks because of their potential for making or breaking peace-sustaining efforts in both the short and long term. Angola provides perhaps the clearest example of the danger of holding elections before demobilization has been substantially completed. Longer-term problems as a result of inadequate disarmament and reintegration efforts are harder to quantify. While some analysts argue that high crime rates in many post-conflict environments can be at least partially attributed to unemployed ex-combatants with ready access to military-style weapons, recent studies suggest that an equal danger may be the 'time bomb' effect of large numbers of unemployed young people with combat skills and weapons who are capable of being mobilized for dubious political purposes (Berdal, 1996, p. 40; Kingma, 2000).

¹ These definitions were developed by the author in the course of preparing draft Principles and Guidelines for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in a peace-keeping environment while engaged as a consultant for the Lessons Learned Unit of the UN Department of Peace-keeping Operations. They have been informed by a variety of sources, including the UNIDIR series cited *supra* and DD&R course materials developed at the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (PPC) in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia.

The **disarmament** aspect of the demobilization process involves the collection, control and disposal of small arms, light and heavy weapons of the former combatants and, in many cases, of the general population together with the development of responsible arms management programs for the effective control of weapons over the medium and longer term. Such measures include the enactment and implementation of a national legal framework for the regulation of weapons ownership and possession within the country as well as controls on interstate transfers, training in customs procedures and, ideally, interstate cooperation in the control of cross-border weapons flows. In West Africa, for example, what began as an initiative of the Mali government to curb the proliferation in that country of small arms and light weapons has now progressed to a sub-regional moratorium.

In contrast to this comprehensive approach, what has more often occurred in the context of peace operations is the mismanagement, or even non-management, of arms. The disarmament process, like the rest of the DD&R program, should not be an after-thought or ad hoc process but a fundamental part of the peace negotiation and peace implementation processes. The disastrous consequences of an omission of disarmament were evident in Somalia, where then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali undertook strenuous efforts to include disarmament in the UNITAF mandate while the US government steadfastly refused to do so, fearing that the duration of the mission would thus be unduly prolonged (UNIDIR, 1995). Effective DD&R must be designed and implemented as an integral part of the overall post-conflict national recovery strategy. In other words, DD&R must be carried out in a manner that supports and, if possible, enhances broader reconstruction and development goals. From this

perspective, disarmament and demobilization are important components of the reform of the state security apparatus and can be pursued effectively only in tandem with reform of the military, police, judiciary and penal systems. In turn, these reforms become part of the broader process of democratization through the creation of a multi-party electoral system that is underpinned by effective and accountable governmental institutions.

Reintegration programs are an essential concomitant of a successful demobilization effort and refer to programs of cash or in-kind compensation, training and income generation intended to increase the economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants and their families. Program components that address the issue of reconciliation or ‘peace with justice’. Are a particularly important part of the overall reintegration plan. Finding the right balance between justice and forgiveness is extraordinarily difficult and will be unique in each situation. A key aim of the DD&R plan should be to empower the society to find that balance.

If properly planned and implemented in a comprehensive and coherent way (and this is of course more easily said than done), DD&R can be an important instrument in the overall rebuilding of a post-conflict society. DD&R should be seen not as an add-on but as an integral part of the process of developing good governance.

A comprehensive, integrated and coordinated approach

Given the political, institutional and technical complexities of the post-conflict DD&R process, the diversity of actors involved in its various stages and the overlapping nature of many of the phases, the requirement for integrated planning and effective coordination from the outset is particularly acute. This in turn necessitates a substantial donor commitment very early in the peace process, a requirement that is difficult to meet in practice.

Commitment of the parties and inclusive process

The best technical planning will not obviate the need for the commitment of the parties to the DD&R process and their full involvement in its planning and implementation. In addition to the political and military leadership, every effort must be made to involve civil society in the development of the DD&R plan. Reintegration simply will not be possible without the cooperation of those with whom the former combatants seek to live and work. In other words, if democratic institutions and processes are the objective, then democratic methods need to be employed to secure their achievement. Top-down processes that take little account of local needs and aspirations are unlikely to produce responsive, responsible political institutions. Even where broadly inclusive processes are developed to inform the peace negotiation process, there may still be considerable reluctance to involve civil society in the determination of which programs and forms of assistance are appropriate for former combatants. In the Guatemalan peace process, for

example—inclusive in many aspects of the 14-year negotiation—no civil society inputs were permitted on the question of ex-combatant entitlements, with the result that local NGOs were uninformed about these programs several months into their implementation.² Rather than facilitating reintegration, such an approach exacerbates the risk inherent in DD&R of creating a permanent ‘special status’ mentality among ex-combatants and ongoing resentment by those not equally privileged. Community inputs are important for more than the promotion of social cohesion, however. If the ‘R’—reintegration—in DD&R is to stand for something more than temporary or even permanent hand-outs to a privileged group, then assistance programs must be related to the generation of meaningful economic opportunities in the communities where the ex-combatants resettle. This can only occur if those communities are fully involved in the design of the reintegration program.

Reinforcement of local capacities and expertise

The most fundamental principle for the planning and implementation of DD&R is the enhancement of local ownership, empowerment and capacity-building through active consultation, engagement and participation. All too often, however, this principle is sacrificed to external timeframes and notions of efficiency. In Sierra Leone, for example, in the summer and fall of 1998, before the last onslaught on the capital and when there was still hope that the rebels could be contained, efforts were underway to begin to implement a comprehensive DD&R plan that had been developed with many local inputs. However, in the view of the World Bank and certain donors, the process of getting all the local actors to move

to implementation was taking too long, necessitating the imposition of a new process which they controlled. The result was a profound alienation of many dedicated local NGOs which described themselves as mere ‘bystanders’ to the new, more ‘efficient’ DD&R process. The experience in Sierra Leone underscores the challenge for external intervenors in facilitating local participation in a crisis-driven environment.

Relevance of key DD&R principles to a preventive strategy

Why should DD&R be conceptualized as only relevant to post-conflict peace building? It would seem self-evident that a comprehensive DD&R program is ideally suited to pre-conflict environments, as part of sound development policies aimed at fostering the creation of legitimate, inclusive institutions and processes capable of resolving differences, however acute, by peaceful means. The introduction to this paper outlined how a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution has gradually been replaced by a focus on short-term crisis management techniques. Once we move away from the crisis reaction model, to a genuinely preventive mode, the contribution that security sector reform can make becomes much clearer. In other words, if we are serious about good governance as the basis for sustainable development, then development strategies to foster effective, accountable government institutions have to focus on *all* the relevant institutions and processes, not only on those traditionally in the focus of development agencies. This is particularly important if we take into account the propensity for derailing unwanted reform processes, inherent in unduly powerful and unaccountable military forces. Similarly, without sufficient internal security and stability through the proper functioning of the police, judiciary and penal systems, it will become increasingly difficult to carry out any development efforts.

Recognition of conflict prevention as a central development goal is behind the work of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation. After developing Policy Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, the DAC is now attempting to operationalize these concepts. In this regard, detailed attention has now turned to security sector reform (see, e.g., NUPI, 1999; and BICC Brief 16 on security sector reform).

Impediments to a sustained development assistance focus on prevention

The biggest problem for donor governments in making a commitment to a sustained focus on conflict prevention rather than crisis reaction is the sheer invisibility of prevention. How can politicians seeking re-election on their record of achievement demonstrate that they have prevented anything? How can they justify devoting increased resources to cases not yet in crisis when the public’s attention is inevitably drawn only to those cases clearly in crisis? It is not, however, only a question of allocating new resources or determining the proper balance of current resources between long-term development and short-term humanitarian assistance. It is also a question of reorienting current international development programs to a more inclusive approach, better suited to meeting the stated goal of good governance. Should this strategy ultimately bear fruit in helping to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict, then the increasing need to

² This assessment is based on observations and interviews by the author during a field mission to the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) in June 1998.

divert long-term development funds to short-term humanitarian assistance may begin to be alleviated. On the issue of resource allocation for overseas development assistance (ODA), it is interesting to note the recent British initiative to focus a significant portion of its ODA on security sector reform (Short, 1999).

In applying the lessons of post-conflict DD&R, the key to effective development assistance in the area of security sector reform will be donor coherence both within individual countries and among major donors. In terms of the former, it is again encouraging to note that Clare Short, International Development Secretary of the British government, drew specific attention to the UK's efforts to ensure that Foreign and Defence Ministry programs relating to the security sector were "complementary and coherent". Achieving such complementarity *among* donor countries remains a daunting task because it is impeded by an array of vested interests, not least of which is the politicians' desire for high donor visibility at home and abroad through the medium of funding tied to discrete aid projects. Perhaps one way to avoid these self-made traps is the development and wide promulgation of a standard for the delivery of development assistance directed at security sector reform. The DAC work on common policy guidelines in the area of security and development is an excellent beginning. It must be buttressed by a series of concrete 'best practices' to which individual donor countries are then encouraged to publicly commit themselves. Early championing of such an approach—including some concrete measure of public accountability—by one or more major donors could then help put pressure on other donors to do the same.

In order for this approach to work, political leadership is required not only to take the steps outlined above but also to engage in an effort to better educate the public on the benefits and requirements of good foreign aid policy. Only in this manner can there be any hope of drowning out the cacophony of domestic special interests that benefit from the current system of project allocation—a system that, in many countries, is determined largely in response to domestic, not foreign aid, imperatives.

In conclusion, some comment is perhaps warranted on the pitfalls of promoting good governance abroad when not all is well at home. With our politicians increasingly focussing on the short term, on public relations over substance, on managing rather than resolving problems, on reactive rather than proactive foreign policies, we should not be surprised to find these same factors at work in the area of international development assistance. In other words, the weaknesses in our international development programs are largely domestically created and driven. In this age of increasing public cynicism regarding our institutions of democracy, there is an urgent need for a much greater societal engagement in what constitutes the necessary underpinnings for democracy at the stage of development we have now reached. In Canada, for example, a country that has as part of its constitutional preamble the goal of "peace, order and good government", its citizens increasingly—and rightly—reject the prescriptions of discredited bureaucratic elites but seem unconcerned that they are hardly in a position to offer informed alternatives. In such circumstances, there is an acute need for a deeper public understanding of the nature of the responsibilities of individual citizens and civil society (Stairs, 1998, pp. 23–53). Perhaps even more important is a better appreciation of the limits of the capacities of non-

governmental actors. Yet, at a time when the easiest rallying cry in the world's only superpower is an anti-government one, the opportunity for meaningful dialogue on responsible leadership, both inside and outside government, seems increasingly remote.

While a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution would seem to be the only one capable of addressing the root causes of conflict, we must be mindful of the real limits of the 'social engineering' efforts pursued by well-meaning outsiders. Nowhere is this likely to be more true than in relation to security sector reform, given the powerful vested interests at play. If we are to avoid yet more 'paving of the road to hell with our manifold good intentions', we must ensure that the professed cardinal principle of development efforts—local empowerment and local ownership—is honored at least as much in future practice as it is in current theory.

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Forthcoming in June: **conversion survey 2000**

In 1999 the world risked losing sight of ongoing disarmament and conversion efforts as wars such as those in Kosovo and Chechnya took to the headlines. Nuclear arms negotiations stalled, 'old' conflicts continued, and the United States extended its role as the dominant military power, prompting a debate in Europe as to its own military structures and function.

Against this backdrop, the current *conversion survey* of the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) directs attention back to the tangible achievements in disarmament which have taken place over the last two years. Ground-breaking initiatives against landmines, small arms and the use of child soldiers are important steps in the right direction, as was the initial progress in Northern Ireland. True, the revised CFE Treaty could have achieved more, but it still embodies an element of stability. Fewer resources were invested in armed forces than in previous years and global disarmament continued, although at a slower pace. Conversion may not be at the center of international attention but it remains an important activity in many regions of the world.

An overview of developments in five of BICC's conversion issue areas in the years 1998/99 is provided in the Update. This begins with the BIC3D Index—which uses empirical data to attempt to quantify the degree of resources released through disarmament—and then reports on regional and country trends in military


expenditures; military research and development; restructuring and conversion of the defense industry; base closure and redevelopment; and disposal of surplus weapons.

The Topic chapter highlights demobilization and reintegration in the 1990s, outlining the considerable decline in armed forces personnel since the peak of 1987. It shows how diverse the background conditions can be: western market economies, transition countries and post-war societies require very different approaches to the management of demobilization and reintegration. Nevertheless a pool of basic policy tools does exist.

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**Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,
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
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By 1998 global military expenditures had been reduced by more than one-third of the amount spent a decade earlier before the Cold War finally ended and when there had been high hopes for a peace dividend.

The objective of the book, an edited volume published by the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), is to shed more light on the nature of the peace dividend, beyond the expectations it engendered. What does, or did, it comprise in reality? Did peace dividends emerge at all, or have they receded or vanished altogether since? The book seeks to unveil the myths and realities of the peace dividend by attempting to determine whether there is a direct link between reduced military expenditures and positive

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About the Center

The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) facilitates the processes whereby people, skills, technology, equipment, and financial and economic resources are shifted away from the defense sector and applied to alternative civilian uses. BICC supports governmental and non-governmental initiatives as well as public and private sector organizations by finding ways to reduce costs and enhance effectiveness in the draw-down of military-related activities. As a result, BICC contributes to disarmament, demilitarization, peace-building, post-conflict rehabilitation and human development.

International think tank

BICC conducts research and makes policy suggestions. Experts provide comparative analyses and background studies on topics such as military expenditures and the peace dividend, management and disposal of surplus weapons, and the conversion of military research and development (R&D) infrastructures.

Project management and consulting services

BICC provides practical support to public and private organizations in a range of conversion projects. For instance, BICC staff advise local governments confronted with the difficult task of redeveloping former military installations. They help former defense industries cope with the transition to producing civilian goods. BICC also links development assistance and conversion by providing help with demobilization, reintegration and peace-building.

Clearinghouse

Using its independent status, BICC provides conversion support and information to international organizations, government agencies, non-governmental organizations, companies and the media as well as to individuals and organizations of the private and public sector. In this role, it mediates and facilitates the conversion process at all levels—local, national and global.

BICC's six program areas:

- *Reduced military expenditures—
A lasting peace dividend?*
- *Reorientation of military R&D—
A potential largely untapped*
- *Defense industry restructuring—
Facing a changed environment*
- *Demobilization and reintegration—
Opportunities for human development*
- *Base closure and redevelopment—
A challenge for communities*
- *Surplus weapons—Dismantling the
remnants of conflicts*

The Bonn International Center for Conversion was established in 1994 with generous support from the State of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). The Center's Trustees include the two German states of North Rhine-Westphalia and Brandenburg as well as the Westdeutsche Landesbank-Girozentrale (WestLB), Düsseldorf/Münster and the Landesentwicklungsgesellschaft NRW (LEG) (Development Agency). BICC cooperates with multilateral institutions, German organizations and international organizations.

Published by
© BICC, Bonn 2000
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E-mail: bicc@bicc.de
Internet: <http://www.bicc.de>
ISSN 0947-7322
Layout: Svenja Görgens
Printed in Germany
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